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*Cambodes*

## Senate Votes Defense Bill Involving War Powers

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 29.—The Senate ended a long battle over imposing Congressional restrictions on the President's war-making powers tonight by passing, 70 to 2, a compromise version of a \$66.6-billion defense appropriations bill.

The bill was passed earlier in the day by the House, 234 to 185, and it now goes to the White House for President Nixon's signature, about six months after the start of the fiscal year. The measure provides \$2-billion less than requested by the Administration for the Defense Department during the current fiscal year.

Only Senator Charles E. Goodell, Republican of New York, and Albert Gore, Democrat of Tennessee—both of whom were defeated in the last election—voted against the measure.

At the Senate's insistence, language that Senate doves had protested could provide a Congressional mandate for Presidential expansion of the war in Indochina was stripped from the bill.

As it originally passed the

Senate, the defense bill prohibited the President from introducing American ground combat troops into Cambodia, as well as Laos and Thailand. This was an expansion of a prohibition, which the doves had succeeded in writing into last year's defense bill, banning the introduction of American troops into Laos or Thailand.

But in the Senate-House conference, the House conferees, with Administration support, insisted upon writing into this prohibition on Cambodia some language that Senate doves considered a loophole giving the President wide discretionary authority.

The language provided that the ban on introducing ground troops would not prevent the President from taking actions that he deemed necessary to insure the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam or to obtain the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

At a session early this morning, the Senate refused to accept the original compromise version of the defense bill and sent it back to the Senate-

House conference with the understanding that the new language on Cambodia would be deleted.

The House conferees agreed in the second conference to delete any reference to Cambodia as well as the provision considered a loophole. Thus the bill was left with a prohibition on the introduction of ground combat troops into Thailand or Laos.

But the House conferees insisted on retaining conditional language on restrictions on the use of \$2.5-billion earmarked for "free world forces" in Southeast Asia, such as South Vietnam and Thailand.

The bill, as drafted by the Senate, provided that none of these "free world forces" funds could be used "in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos."

To this restriction, the House conferees insisted upon adding additional language stating that nothing in the restriction would "prohibit support of actions required to insure the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war."

Senator John Stennis, Mississippi Democrat, chairman of the Armed Service Committee, said in floor debate "to permit an expansion of the war" or "to authorize the use of South Vietnamese or other free-world forces to go to the rescue of

the Government of Cambodia or Laos."

On the legislative restrictions on the President, Senator Church contended that the "controlling language" now is the same as the restrictions that the Senate incorporated in a supplemental foreign aid authorization bill as well as the language retained in the defense bill prohibiting the introduction of ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand.

There still remain differences of interpretation on how binding these restrictions are upon the President. But while the dividing line between Congress and the executive branch on warmaking powers remain imprecise, Senate doves were convinced that they had imposed statutory restrictions on the President's ability to make war without Congressional consent.

## Arms for Cambodia Voted; Congress Bars Troop Use

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 22—The Senate passed legislation today authorizing a \$255-million military aid program for Cambodia but embodying restrictions to keep the President from sending ground combat troops or military advisers to Cambodia.

The compromise legislation, which authorizes \$525-million in supplementary foreign aid for countries in Asia and the Middle East, was sent to the House, where it was quickly adopted by a voice vote and sent to President Nixon.

Adoption of the foreign aid authorization bill, by a vote of 41 to 20, ends months of Congressional debate over the issue

of imposing Congressional restrictions on the President's warmaking powers and removes one legislative obstacle in the way of adjournment.

But a new argument broke out over whether a provision on Cambodia would be removed from the defense appropriations bill.

The Senate incorporated in the foreign aid bill a version of the amendment on Cambodia originally sponsored by Senators John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, and Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho. The Senate provision prevents the Presi-

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dent from using any funds to introduce ground combat troops or military advisers into Cambodia and stipulates that the military aid program does not constitute a defense commitment to the Cambodian Government.

With the tacit support of the Administration, the Senate provision was accepted by conferees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and incorporated in the compromise foreign aid legislation.

However, also with tacit Administration support, conferees of the House and Senate appropriations Committee were writing what members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarded as a loophole into the defense appropriations bill.

As passed by the Senate, the defense bill embodied a prohibition against the introduction of ground combat troops into Cambodia—as well as into Laos and Thailand.

But in conference, members of the Appropriations Committee wrote in a provision that stated that this prohibition would not prevent the President from taking any steps he deemed necessary to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal of American troops from Cambodia or to obtain the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.

Senator George D. Aiken of Vermont, ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, argues today on the Senate floor that there had been an understanding that the provision on Cambodia would be removed from the defense bill if the Senate would pass the foreign aid authorization bill.

The language in the defense bill, he says, not only nullified the restrictions on Cambodia in the foreign aid bill but also could be interpreted as a Congressional mandate for a Presidential expansion of the war in Southeast Asia.

But Representative George H. Mahon, Democrat of Texas, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, denied in an interview that there ever had been any understanding with the House committee that the language on Cambodia would be deleted from the defense bill.

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## SENATE SNARLED ON MAJOR ISSUES; A VETO SUSTAINED

48-35 Vote Upholds Nixon  
on Manpower Training—  
Food Stamps Imperiled

By JOHN W. FINNEY  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21 — The legislative logjam blocking Congressional adjournment showed some signs of breaking up around the edges today, but the Senate remained stuck on the central issues of a supersonic transport, Cambodian aid welfare reform and trade quotas.

With the Senate enmeshed in two concurrent filibusters about the only legislative business it would transact was to accept the inevitable by passing and sending to the House a resolution providing that Congress would return on Dec. 28 after a five-day Christmass recess.

Tonight the Senate failed to override President Nixon's veto of the \$9.5-billion manpower training bill. The vote was 48-35 in favor of overriding, eight votes short of the two-thirds majority needed to override a veto.

**Food Stamps Periled**  
Meanwhile, a deadlock between Senate and House negotiators continued today to threaten the food stamp program, under which some nine million Americans receive food at discount prices. The program expires Dec. 31 unless it is extended.

The Senate ended one small filibuster, conducted by Albert Gore, Democrat of Tennessee, by passing a compromise version of a bill providing contributions to various international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.

Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, majority leader, proclaimed the Senate's action to be "the first break in the wall."

blocking adjournment. But then Treasury officials said the compromise was unacceptable to the Administration, thus raising the threat that the House would refuse to accept the Senate version of the bill.

### SST and Welfare Debated

On its double-shift schedule, the Senate debated the supersonic transport in the morning and early afternoon and then welfare reform in the late afternoon and evening. There were no signs of a break in either debate, both of which were largely monologues by individual Senators before a largely vacant chamber.

The Senate will make another move tomorrow to cut off the S.S.T. debate through a closure motion. The first attempt to impose closure failed Saturday by a 48-to-43 vote, or 18 short of the required two-thirds majority. While some shifts toward closure are expected tomorrow, even Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, the principal defender of the S.S.T. project, was acknowledging that the attempt would probably fail.

Negotiations to reach a compromise were at a standstill. Senator Jackson and other supporters of the supersonic plane are insistent that the Senate approve the full \$210-million for the project that was voted by a House-Senate conference committee on a Transportation Department appropriations bill. They argue that the filibuster is blocking essential appropriations for the Transportation Department as well as highway construction funds.

The opposition, in turn, was using the threat of blocked Transportation appropriations in an effort to force the other side to accept a compromise. The opposition is led by Senator William Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin.

Conferees of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee reached agreement today on legislation authorizing \$535-million in supplemental foreign aid, including \$255-million for Cambodia. With tacit Adminis-

tration approval, the House conferees accepted a Senate amendment in the bill prohibiting the President from sending ground combat troops or military ad-

visers to Cambodia and emphasizing that the planned military aid did not represent an American commitment to support the Cambodian Government.

But Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, decided not to call up the bill today when members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees showed signs of not yielding on the Cambodian language they had included in the defense appropriations bill.

### Prohibition at Issue

The Senate had inserted a provision in the defense appropriation bill prohibiting the President from introducing ground combat troops into Cambodia. But in conference, members of the Appropriations Committees added another provision stating that this prohibition would not prevent the President from taking any actions he deemed necessary to facilitate the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam or to obtain the release of Americans held as prisoners of war in North Vietnam.

It was announced Saturday that the Appropriations Committees would delete all the Cambodian language in the defense bill if the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee in turn would pass the foreign aid authorization bill. But today this arrangement ran into objections from the more hawkish members of the Appropriations Committees, who complained that the Foreign Relations Committee, with its language in the foreign aid bill, was attempting to tie the hands of the President.

President Nixon has threatened to convene the new Congress on Jan. 3 if the present Congress fails to complete action on the Administration's program.

Congress has already passed a resolution specifying that the new Congress will convene on Jan. 21, but the White House on Saturday raised the threat

that the President might withhold his necessary signature from the resolution, thus forcing the new Congress under the Constitution to convene on Jan. 3.

"We'll be here until Jan. 3 anyway," Senator Mansfield told reporters today. "If he doesn't want to sign the resolution, then under the constitution we will have to convene the new Congress on Jan. 3."

The new Congress would not be able to start work immediately on the Administration's program since all legislation expires with one Congress and would have to be reported out again by committees in a new Congress.

REMEMBER THE NEEDIEST!

This language would clearly prevent the deployment, for an extended period of time, of a substantial number of American troops in Cambodia. If the President intended to do that, the money is not made available for that purpose, and it would be necessary for him to return to Congress and ask our consent. But it is true that, as Commander in Chief, within a limited area, the President has power to initiate action designed to protect American troops in the field.

Mr. STENNIS. If I may ask the Senator this question, with reference to the battle of the sanctuary, the areas that the President invaded this summer, to destroy ammunition, and so forth, would the Senator think that his language prohibits a repetition of that if the facts are similar and conditions are pressing?

Mr. CHURCH. If there were a particular concentration just over the border which constituted a serious, imminent threat, that could be suddenly struck and destroyed, that might fall within the President's powers as Commander in Chief. However, I could not say to the Senator that undertaking an extended invasion of Cambodia with a large American expeditionary force for six or eight weeks falls within the scope of his power under the Constitution as Commander in Chief.

This whole question was fully explored in the course of the earlier debate.

From a conversation I had with the President last evening, it is my understanding now that he no longer takes exception to the limiting language. He feels it conforms with his own policy in Cambodia. He says he has no intention of sending back troops. He no longer persists in objecting to language of this kind. I could not say, however, that this prohibition in the bill would not preclude an invasion of Cambodia on the scale that took place and for the length of time that occurred last summer. I feel it would.

Mr. STENNIS. On that point right there, the Senator understands that no President, no Commander in Chief, no Army field commander, can tell how long it would take to carry out an objective. They go into the unknown. Also it takes time to prepare for such an attack on a sanctuary. So the President and his advisers might have to have 3 or 4 weeks, or even longer, to prepare. It is a deliberate act. It is not an extreme, rash act.

So the Senator would not preclude, then, a bona fide effort, the planning of an attack, an invasion, technically, of the country to clear out and clean out a sanctuary that was an imminent threat to our men in South Vietnam?

Mr. CHURCH. I would say, in reply to the Senator that, in the first place, there would be nothing to preclude whatever any planning on any military mission. Yet, on the basis of precedents, the President's power as Commander in Chief to undertake military action is strictly limited to actions restricted both in scope and time, and which are directly related to the need to protect American troops in the field.

Mr. STENNIS. While I am on that, the Senator does recognize that it takes time, and cannot always be foretold exactly?

Mr. CHURCH. Yes, I appreciate that there is no way to foretell precisely the length of an intervention.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRAVEL. I yield to the Senator from Vermont for an observation.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I do not think the Committee on Foreign Relations now takes a position much different than it took last spring. If an incursion is necessary for the safety of our men, there would be no objection, but an invasion, which, as stated by the Senator from Mississippi, would require a long time in preparation and probably a long time to carry out, would have to be reported back to the Senate before it was

undertaken. The committee did make a sharp distinction between an incursion and an invasion.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. GRAVEL. I yield to the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. SPARKMAN. May I say that I did not understand that the Senator from Mississippi was speaking of an invasion. The term "incursion" was used, I think, in referring to it. But I think it is the objective that is controlling—in other words, the protection of American lives.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct, and my question was based on the incursion or the thrust, rather than a large scale invasion.

Mr. SPARKMAN. To protect American lives.

Mr. STENNIS. Primarily to protect the lives of our soldiers, our military men. I did make the point that sometimes it took weeks even to plan an incursion and get ready for it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I wish to say that there is nothing in here that intends to limit the President's constitutional powers to act in an emergency in order to protect American lives.

Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate the Senator's answer; and, if I may respond quite briefly to the Senator from Idaho, Mr. President, I do not think it is definitely known, according to the precedents of history or according to this debate, just what the extent of the President's powers as Commander in Chief is. I think it depends greatly on the circumstances. I do not want any hard law here that would create any cloud or any doubt in any President's mind as to what his responsibilities are. I want to leave him with the responsibilities as well as the powers. If we do not leave the powers and the responsibilities with him, then it is not his fault or he is not to blame, and we have no head of State to that extent.

Mr. SPARKMAN. There is no effort here to limit the President's emergency powers or his constitutional powers.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. That is why I am so concerned about this. The point first came up, as far as written law is concerned, in the military procurement bill. The battle of the sanctuaries was on then, and we put language in there that was approved by this body, that he would not be restricted as long as it was tied to our men and their safety in the draw-down. The battle over that language is going on now in appropriation bills and elsewhere, as well as here.

It seems to me that the colloquy has made it clear that this language does not take any of the responsibility nor the power away from the President of the United States to do what he thinks is reasonably necessary, within reasonable limitations of time, in destroying arsenals, armories, armies, or anything else that is in close proximity to our borders, which we have designated by the general term "sanctuaries," as in the past.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, may I make one observation? Will the Senator yield for that purpose?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. CHURCH. It is perfectly true that it does not lie within the power of this body, even if we were to harbor an intention to do so, to curtail the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief.

What we seek to do here is assert congressional powers over the spending of the public money. That is within our authority. It is clear, as far as my evidence indicates, that the President is now willing to acquiesce in a limitation of this kind imposed upon the funds made available in this bill and in other bills, vis-a-vis Cambodia.

It follows that if the President were later to decide that it is in the national interest to repeat an extended, full scale military invasion of Cambodia, he would come back to Congress and ask our consent.

We are exercising our power. I recognize that it is not within our reach to undermine

such constitutional powers as vest in the presidency in the role of Commander in Chief.

Mr. CHURCH. In view of the fact that the administration has accepted the pertinent language in the Senate version of the supplemental foreign assistance authorization bill, including the Cooper-Church amendment, and the fact that the House and Senate conferees, representing the two legislative committees concerned, have concurred in that language, I hope it will now prove possible to eliminate from the appropriations conference reports those provisions that contradict and undercut these provisions in the authorizing legislation. If such an accommodation could be reached, we could then complete our legislative work on all the unfinished defense and foreign aid appropriation measures.

#### UNSNARLING THE CAMBODIA AID TANGLE

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I do not think that the editorial in this morning's Washington Post, entitled "Unsnarling the Cambodia Aid Tangle," should stand without comment.

The editorial complains that the "potentialities for a misreading" of the words and deeds of American legislators "should be apparent to anyone who casts even a casual glance at the Senate's debate on whether its voting of \$255 million in aid to Cambodia constitutes a 'commitment' or not."

It is obvious to me, from reading the editorial, that the writer has cast only a casual glance—and nothing more—at the Senate debate.

The editorial expresses respect for Senator FULBRIGHT's concept "that the Senate must assert its constitutional duty to approve foreign commitments." But it then goes on to say that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee failed to assert that duty because, the editorial continues, he should have been emphasizing that approval of the money was not equivalent to a treaty, and attempting "to nail down the administration tightly to that other interpretation," instead of charging, as he did and as others did, that "approval of this money is equivalent to a treaty."

What more would the writer have had Senator FULBRIGHT and other Senators who agreed with him do if they believed that approving the President's supplemental aid request constituted senatorial endorsement of a commitment which was, in fact, as much of a commitment as a treaty would have been.

The committee did include an amendment to the bill which made it clear that the giving of aid should not be construed as a commitment to come to the defense of Cambodia. But some members of the Senate feel that approval of the funds does constitute a commitment nevertheless—if a quarter of a billion dollars a year to a nation of 6 million does not involve a commitment; what does?

In fact, the staff report prepared for the committee, a portion of which the Post reprints on its editorial page, states clearly that the Cambodians have certainly inferred that the military assis-

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tance program already begun—and begun, it should be noted, by the President without congressional authorization—has been taken by the Cambodians to constitute a commitment of support.

That is exactly the point that was made time and again during the debate. Senator Fulbright argued that for this reason the Senate should look carefully at what to date has been only a Presidential action before lending their endorsement to that decision, having in mind the fact that congressional passage of foreign aid authorizations and appropriations were cited by Secretary Rusk and other officials of the previous administration as commitments to the security of South Vietnam.

As for the question of whether military and economic assistance to Cambodia, once begun, will be "open ended," it should be obvious that since no one knows the enemy's intentions in Cambodia, it is fair to assume that the end to military and economic assistance to Cambodia is certainly not in sight.

The commitment to provide money to Vietnam has proved to be open ended. Why will the commitment to Cambodia not be?

The Cambodians are, after all, fighting the same enemy and are beginning their fight far less well equipped than the South Vietnamese. The staff report, which the editorial cites with approval, states in this connection:

It seems clear that providing effective assistance to Cambodia—sufficient for it to train, arm, equip and sustain in the field a large enough force to hold the present line militarily—will require a Military Assistance Program of several years duration and—given the effect the war has already had on the economy, not to mention the effect the continued fighting will have—a concomitant program of related economic assistance.

Would this writer care to guess at what that total cost of assistance to Cambodia will be—or how long it will continue? The administration certainly has not been willing to do so; indeed how could they?

In previous editorials, the Post has criticized the fact that some Senators insisted on debating for 2 days the question of the Senate's endorsing \$255 million in military and economic assistance for Cambodia. But last spring and summer, those opposed to the Cooper-Church amendment tied the Senate up for some 7 weeks because they did not want to see that amendment brought to a vote until American forces were withdrawn from Cambodia.

The debate last summer, which revolved around the question of committing American ground forces to Cambodia, was described in an editorial on December 19, as "of truly national significance." But the editorial refuses to ascribe any significance at all to a debate on the question of beginning a military and economic assistance program to Cambodia which will run into at least hundreds of millions of dollars and perhaps into billions.

Is the writer of this editorial so much in favor of the administration's proposal that it is unwilling to see the Senate take any action but approve this program

without any discussion. If so, would it not have been more constructive to have stated that view?

I do not believe this editorial does justice to this debate or contribute to public understanding of the important issues involved.

As this and other comparable matters develop, whether the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is right, or whether he is wrong, it should be becoming more clear that what Chairman FULBRIGHT is really doing in these closing days is to stand up for the dignity, the independence, and the constitutional responsibility of the Senate.

I ask unanimous consent that the Washington Post's editorials, to which I have referred, dated December 19 and December 21 together with the Post's excerpt from the committee staff report Cambodia: December 1970, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 19, 1970]

#### THE FILIBUSTER SENATE

For some years this newspaper has contended that the Senate is not a modern legislative body because of its toleration of unlimited debate. During the last few weeks the Senate itself appears to have proved the point beyond the shadow of a doubt.

The filibusters in the lame-duck session have been of the mini variety, but their result has been to throw the legislative program into a state of deep confusion and frustration. The Senate has been literally unable to cope with several of the great issues of the day because a few of its members insist on thwarting the majority will. There was a time when the word "filibuster" conjured up images of long-winded Southerners talking a civil rights measure to death. Now it is the commonest tactic of liberals and conservatives alike and of tiny factions as well as large minorities.

Despite the great pressure on the Senate to clear its congested calendar in the few days that remain, Senators Fulbright and Gravel held up the foreign aid bill for two days in a futile effort to convince their colleagues that the proposed \$255 million in aid for Cambodia would lead to a commitment to the present regime in that country even though the legislation itself would prohibit the President from sending in any ground troops or military advisers. Fortunately a vote was finally permitted. The Senate has been further plagued by threats of extended debate on the trade bill and on the conference report involving the controversial SST project. This newspaper has opposed both the trade bill and the SST, but we do not condone stringing out the debate so as to prevent a vote.

The basic trouble is, of course, that the Senate has dawdled along through most of its 1970 session. Several long filibusters when the pressure was less intense left it with an unmanageable burden as the end of the session approached. Undoubtedly many of its debates were highly educational, to use the euphemism customarily employed by the filibusters themselves. The seven weeks of discussion of the Cooper-Church amendment to limit the war in Cambodia, for example, was of truly national significance. Yet the fact remains that a legislative body confronted by a mountain of vital issues can no longer afford the luxury of unlimited debate on any thing.

Nor is there any real hope in the cloture rule which can be invoked only on a two-

thirds vote. It is rather an invitation to the obstructionists to keep on talking. One of the most constructive proposals to come before Congress in recent years—the proposed constitutional amendment for direct election of the President—failed a few months ago because the Senate majority in favor of it could not muster a two-third vote to end a filibuster. In our view, the Senate's first order of business in 1971 should be reform of its cloture rule.

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 21, 1970]

#### UNSNARLING THE CAMBODIA AID TANGLE

It is difficult, indeed, misleading and artificial, to separate the way the Senate has been conducting its business from the specific nature of its business, and nowhere more so than in respect to its deliberations on military aid to Cambodia. Perplexed as many Americans may be as to just what the Senate has done, we have considerable sympathy for those foreigners—in Phnom Penh, Saigon, Hanoi and elsewhere—who are faced with the task of determining what the Senate's actions mean to them. If diplomats, who count themselves experts at this sort of thing, often mistake each other's "signals," think of how foreign governments may read the words and deeds of American legislators. The potentialities for a misreading should be apparent to anyone who casts even a casual glance at the Senate's debate on whether its voting of \$255 million in aid to Cambodia constitutes a "commitment" or not.

Granted that a certain amount of ambiguity is inherent in the purpose of American policy and in the nature of the domestic political setting of that policy, the Senate still should have been able to speak with a clearer voice. For the lapse, we place the chief responsibility on Mr. Fulbright. His guiding concept, as we understand (and respect) it, is that the Senate must assert its constitutional duty to approve foreign commitments. Yet that is precisely what the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee failed to do. Quite typical was his pettish charge that "approval of this money is equivalent to a treaty"; he should have been asserting exactly the opposite and attempting to nail down the administration tightly to that other interpretation. And having received from two of his own staff members a very balanced and perceptive report on Cambodia, excerpted elsewhere on this page "For the Record," he let it wither unpicked on the vine. No amount of latter-day complaining that the President has stolen the Senate's powers will obscure Mr. Fulbright's inadequate pursuit of the "thief."

Fortunately, Senators Church and Cooper were there to do the essential work of tacking on to the aid money provisions banning use of American ground forces or military advisers in Cambodia. Fairly, Mr. Church saluted his own handiwork as a successful—if belated—application of control on the Executive. Secretary of State Rogers' letter late Saturday, in which he said "the administration's programs, policies and intentions in Cambodia in no way conflict" with the Cooper-Church language, was a welcome—if even more belated—acknowledgement of an administration position that should have been made explicit months ago.

Earlier in the week, Mr. Fulbright declared that to vote the funds would be to endorse "enlargement of the war," but this is an arch misreading. Voting the funds means providing the means for Cambodia to continue the policies—such as closing down Sihanoukville and keeping heat on the sanctuaries alongside Vietnam—that are integral to Vietnamization in Vietnam. Can it be that Mr. Fulbright wants to see full restored use of the port nad sanctuaries? Of course not. Rather, we suspect that he did not think the matter through.

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Some Cambodians have "inferred," the staff report to Mr. Fulbright stated, that the American aid program constitutes a commitment to them. Their inference is probably unavoidable but it is essential that Americans not contribute to or reinforce it. It was the Cambodians, faced with what they believe to be an invasion by foreigners (North Vietnamese), who came to the United States for aid. Washington had its own reasons to offer help—in order to get on with Vietnamization—and so a deal was made. This is what the administration says, though not so inelegantly, and this is what it should be held to. The Senate, which controls the money, has the power to do precisely that. "Unwise" the aid may or may not be, as Senator Gravel charged. "Open-ended," it need not be, if the Senate will but do its job.

The language in the Defense appropriations bill authorizing the President to take any action he wishes to promote withdrawal of United States forces from Southeast Asia and to retrieve American POWs, was mischievous, provocative and unnecessary. It should have been stricken long before the Rogers' letter of Saturday broke the logjam of which it was a central part. The thrust of any Senate language on Cambodia and Vietnam ought to be to define and circumscribe Executive actions nad thereby to share responsibility for them within the limits set. It is irresponsible to write blank checks for the President, which in any case he could write and spend for himself if he were so minded—if he were so foolishly and arrogantly minded, that is.

[From the Washingtonian, February 1970]

**THE WASHINGTON POST WENT UP THE HILL WITH 550,000 MEN; THE WASHINGTON POST CAME DOWN THE HILL, AND NE'R WENT UP AGAIN**

The making of Vietnam policy has been a special agony for Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. But these excerpts from the Washington Post editorial page show why no Commander in Chief has lost much sleep worrying about what this guide to right thinking would have to say.

November 16, 1960—When the United States undertakes the responsibility of sponsoring and defending a government, however, a painful dilemma arises. This country does not, or should not, want satellites. But responsibility without effective direction is the most vexing of all relationships.

April 7, 1961—The United States has a major interest in the defense of Vietnam, not only because of the vast amounts of economic and military aid (which only recently has been turned to the all-important guerrilla warfare training), but also because American prestige is very much involved in the effort to protect the Vietnamese people from Communist absorption.

February 25, 1962—We must take up our great-power burdens and fight our proxy wars with an awareness that the pursuit of these military purposes endangers not only our forces in the field but our institutions and our beliefs at home.

December 18, 1963—A curious situation prevails in the dirty war and murky politics of Vietnam. The United States, which supports the regime in the South, can't afford to lose. Defeat would undermine its positions in Southeast Asia and its prestige everywhere.

February 21, 1964—It can be argued, with much logic, that the United States must either do a great deal more in South Vietnam, or else do a great deal less. Its present posture is one likely to get it neither the fruits of intervention nor the credit for a peaceful alternative.

May 15, 1964—An on-the-spot military judgment at the highest level preceded the assignment of seventy-five bombers to South Vietnam and the assumption must be that

this is what the situation requires. Those who have a different view may lack the information on which the decision was made.

July 28, 1964—The overriding danger is that, in this mood of frustration and despair, unsound and radical solutions will come to seem the only ones offering a release from present pains. More than ever, this is a time for steadfastness and courage and avoidance of panic. This is the Administration's prescription.

August 12, 1964—The affair in the Tonkin Gulf should demonstrate to those who undertake aggression against South Vietnam that they enjoy no permanent immunity to whatever military response the United States can make most effectively.

February 18, 1965—The violent words and violent acts of the past few days disclose with dreadful clarity that Vietnam is not an isolated battlefield but a part of a long war which the Communist world seems determined to continue until every vestige of Western power and influence has been driven from Asia.

March 22, 1965—We hope that President Johnson will order the Defense Department to forgo the use of all gas and napalm in this war theater at once. The people of this country are prepared for and equal to the hard measures that war dictates, when those measures are clearly inescapable and unavoidable in the prosecution of a military purpose. They will not be reconciled to the use of such weapons where alternate means of defense exist.

March 28, 1965—There is a considerable amount of pious hypocrisy in some of the moans of outrage over the use of nontoxic gases in South Vietnam.

August 11, 1965—President Johnson's statement that there is no substantial division in the country or in Congress about the government's Vietnam policies is certainly right if "division" means disagreement on the American presence in South Vietnam or implies dissent that is politically important.

August 15, 1965—During the course of actual fighting, civilians may be wounded and killed and the tide of battle may engulf and destroy civilian homes. These are calamities commonly incident to such warfare. But these tragedies differ from the wilful and deliberate destruction of homes in reprisal. Thank goodness the Marines are not engaged in that kind of barbarism.

October 18, 1965—If the demonstrations did little mischief and caused little misunderstanding in this country, they may have done quite a bit of mischief abroad. The National Liberation Front, for many long months, has been counting on public opinion in the United States to accomplish what it has been unable to achieve by armed force. . . . They are bound to see the straggling marchers, the ineffectual protest meetings, and the feeble demonstrations through a prism made out of their own narrow and restricted experience.

April 15, 1966—We are in South Vietnam to preserve the right of a small people to govern themselves and make their own choices. That principle will be vindicated whatever the course the people choose. We have undertaken to preserve their opportunity to make a choice.

August 27, 1966—This newspaper has long supported the basic aims and objectives of Administration policy in Vietnam.

September 5, 1966—This is, in a very real sense, the defense of the United States. The Administration has not made enough of the point that we are in Southeast Asia, fundamentally, because our own vital interest is involved . . . . The stark fact remains that this is a struggle about the organization of the world.

January 12, 1967—Congress and the country heard from the President a careful, calm, and measured discussion of the outlook in South Vietnam. One might search the

archives for utterance of a wartime leader that would exceed it in candor and restraint.

October 18, 1967—There is nothing mutually exclusive about the several reasons we fight this war. It is, at once, a war for the independence and integrity of South Vietnam; a war to fulfill treaty commitments; a war to check aggression; a war to limit Chinese expansion; and a war against Communism. These are not contradictory or conflicting purposes. But it makes a great deal of difference which aspect of the war is emphasized.

October 22, 1967—(About the Peace March on the Pentagon.) It is a tragedy enough for dissent to bring violence and violations of the law. It is a double tragedy when dissent growing out of a yearning for peace raises a very real threat of prolonging a war.

October 26, 1967—Still, there is nothing that say generals must answer irrelevant and hypothetical questions from Senators.

November 14, 1967—It is too late for the President to expect silence as the necessary ingredient of this strategy. That he now needs a minimum of dissent and all the cooperation he can get is obvious.

November 26, 1967—It can no longer be argued that we do not have a plan and a timetable and a grand strategy for getting out of Vietnam. The program laid out by General Westmoreland last week is nearly overpowering in the precision of its promises and the almost total absence of qualifications or doubt.

February 25, 1968—That virtue has been diminished by the attacks made upon the integrity of the foundations of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. No doubt this has been done in good conscience, but the Senators, nevertheless, have impaired the force and effect of any assertion of national purpose.

February 29, 1968—The tone and temper of the Vietnam debate is getting uglier at just the moment when the need is greatest for a national display of unity and resolve.

March 6, 1968—it may even be necessary to begin by acknowledging miscalculation—or failure—in the strategy that has carried us from the Tonkin Resolution of 1964, to the first tentative landing of combat troops in early 1965 and the beginning of the bombing of the North, and on to the present involvement of more than 500,000 United States combat troops in a struggle with no clearly visible end-result in sight.

July 22, 1968—But an individual's passionate dislike for the war in Vietnam (as distinguished from war in general) is likely to be related to his political views, his attitude toward Communism, his concept of the United States' role in world affairs, or other factors only indirectly related to conscience.

February 28, 1969—Optimism. Progress. Victory. There had been optimism from John F. Kennedy in 1963, from General Maxwell Taylor in 1964, from Robert McNamara in 1965, Henry Cabot Lodge in 1966, General William Westmoreland in 1967, and Robert Komer in 1968. These were the men in charge, but their predictions were not believed: not by the press, and ultimately not by the public. Too many of the predictions had been wrong. Since 1963, the record of the skeptics and the pessimists has been excellent.

April 19, 1969—Part of the trouble with analyzing the war is whom to believe, and when.

September 10, 1969—And yet we slid or stumbled into the Vietnam involvement in a big way that hasn't worked, and isn't working now.

September 13, 1969—Conceivably, if the President or others in authority ever get around to telling us what they are up to in Vietnam, in terms that are somewhat more believable, it will make more sense.

October 17, 1969—it would please us if he (Nixon) were to move faster, even as we acknowledge that the final decisions must

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be his alone. Perhaps the wisest way for the President to read the Moratorium is as fresh and forceful evidence of the great constituency available in support of his every step to end the war.

November 18, 1969—On Saturday and Sunday, the President by his own account was preoccupied with the football games. It was a fine afternoon for watching football, he is quoted as saying on Saturday, and for sheer piquancy, we have not heard the likes of that since Marie Antoinette.

December 2, 1969—In the process of saving the country, the allies are destroying it.

December 10, 1969—But it all came down to the same thing—when will it end? And while the President couldn't say, presumably because he doesn't know, what he did say amounted to far and away the most confident and optimistic prospectus he has yet given us on the war.

December 17, 1969—So we are engaged in an open-ended exercise in confidence-building which will end presumably, only when we are absolutely positive that the South Vietnamese have acquired the capacity, with or without a formal settlement, to guarantee their own salvation, free of Communist influence, forever.

#### U.S. PARTICIPATION IN INCREASES IN THE RESOURCES OF CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 18306.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BYRD of Virginia) laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 18306) to authorize U.S. participation in increases in the resources of certain international financial institutions, to provide for an annual audit of the Exchange Stabilization Fund by the General Accounting Office, and for other purposes, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendments and agree to the request of the House for a conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and they appointed Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. GORE, Mr. AIKEN, and Mr. CASE conferees on the part of the Senate.

#### THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1970

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, as you know the Supreme Court today handed down its decision in the 18-year-old vote case. It upheld that portion of the Voting Rights Act of 1970 that would extend to our 18-year-old citizens the right to vote in Federal elections. However, the Court failed to uphold the right of 18-year-olds to vote in State and local elections. While I applaud the action of the Court in providing for the participation of our younger citizens in Federal elections, I believe there are a number of compelling reasons why the same age qualification should be extended to State and local elections.

First, if we accept the premise that national elections concern matters of more basic import than other elections, it would seem illogical to permit 18-year-olds to vote in the former and deny them the right to vote in the latter.

Second, many of the problems that most concern our younger citizens, such as the quality of education, are largely a matter of local and State policy, and hence their vote in local and State elections would seem particularly appropriate and necessary, and their point of view especially valuable in devising responsible programs.

Third, it is increasingly obvious that our federal system faces a crisis due among other things to the imbalance between tax resources available to the Federal Government and those available to other jurisdictions. Given this growing crisis, it would seem of vital importance to involve every concerned citizen in proposals designed to find a way to resolve this problem that affects all jurisdictions—Federal, State, and local.

Fourth, the fact that the electorate for Federal elections will be different from the electorate for other elections will create a serious practical problem when conducting and regulating the election process.

In addition to these problems raised by the action of the Supreme Court, there are the often cited and valid reasons for extending the franchise to all elections for 18-year-old citizens.

During the extensive hearings that I conducted as chairman before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Committee on the Judiciary, perhaps the most compelling of these reasons to emerge was the fact that the distance between 21 and 18 has been altered physically and educationally in the almost 200 years since our Constitution was adopted. This generation of young Americans is better educated, better trained, and more aware of the vital issues facing every level of government than any other in our history. The Supreme Court is now convinced that they can make informed decisions concerning matters affecting broad national policy. I am convinced that they can exercise the same maturity of judgment concerning local issues as well.

Additionally, many of our finest young people have become deeply frustrated, if not disaffected, because they believe there are insufficient ways to secure change by working within the system. The full extension of the franchise to 18-year-olds will mean that our system has responded to the needs of the time by offering ways to secure necessary changes in the American way—via the ballot box.

The history of this country is no less than the history of a franchise gradually extended. That may be our true manifest destiny. Property and religious qualifications were the first to go. Restrictions based on race and sex were removed later. Now we see an arbitrary and unrealistic age qualification almost entirely removed. I believe that we must now totally remove this barrier. We must go ahead and finish the job that was commenced in the Voting Rights Act of 1970. A number of people have asked me

what could be done. Given the decision of the Supreme Court today, the only way to achieve our goal is by constitutional amendment.

Fortunately, the means to secure passage of such an amendment are already at hand in the form of Senate Joint Resolution 147. That measure was introduced and sponsored by my distinguished colleague from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH). I think it is fair to say that he has been the prime mover in the effort to lower the voting age. As early as 1942, when he was in the House of Representatives, he introduced a similar joint resolution. He has been a strong and consistent champion of this legislation through the years.

I hope the Senate will be able to vote on the text of Senate Joint Resolution 147 before the end of this Congress. This resolution, which proposes a constitutional amendment to lower the voting age to 18 in all elections, has the benefit of thorough and complete study in this Congress, and is now sponsored by no less than 73 of the Members presently in the Senate, well in excess of the two-thirds required for passage.

Time is of the essence in this matter because most of the State legislatures will be meeting early next year. Thus, I suggest that the Senate consider one of the House joint resolutions that have already passed the House and are on the Senate calendar. One of these is House Joint Resolution 681, which deals with electoral reform. Another is House Joint Resolution 264, which deals with equal rights for men and women. I have been the main proponent of both of these measures, and I would like to see them passed in their present form. However, from a practical standpoint most of us realize that final passage of either is not possible during this session. Hence I suggest that we take up one of these measures and ask that it be amended so that the measure of the Senator from West Virginia, Senate Joint Resolution 147, could be substituted for the present text. The Senate could then pass the measure with amendments and send it back to the House for concurrence. Thus both Houses can take prompt action in moving toward full enfranchisement of 18-year-olds. If this matter does receive the attention its importance and urgency require, passage before the end of this session is yet a possibility.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I am very appreciative of the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Indiana.

Senate Joint Resolution 147, to which the Senator made reference, was introduced by me in the current 91st Congress, as it had been introduced on prior occasions. Over 70 Senators joined me in cosponsorship of this constitutional amendment for 18-year-old voting, not only for Federal offices but also for State and local offices.

I would like the RECORD to reflect that very thorough hearings were held, before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, so ably chaired by the Senator from Indiana. That subcommittee has reported Senate Joint Resolution 147 to the full Judiciary Committee.

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Of course, I would be very happy if it were possible to do what the Senator from Indiana has indicated in his thoughtful remarks, a way to give the vote by a constitutional approach, as in my measure so our 18- and 19- and 20-year-olds could vote in State and local elections.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia. I hope that through the efforts of the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSEN), and others, aided by the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH), that we can all move forward and get action during the final hours of this session.

## MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 18306) to authorize U.S. participation in increases in the resources of certain international financial institutions, to provide for an annual audit of the exchange stabilization fund by the General Accounting Office, and for other purposes; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. BARRETT, Mr. REUSS, Mr. ASHLEY, Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. WIDNALL, Mr. STANTON, and Mr. BROWN of Michigan were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message also announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 13493) to change the name of certain projects for navigation and other purposes on the Arkansas River, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

## EMPLOYMENT AND MANPOWER ACT OF 1970—VETO

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the hour of 6 p.m. almost having arrived, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate the business which is to be taken up at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAVEL). Under the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the President's veto message on S. 3867, a bill to assure opportunities for employment and training to unemployed and underemployed persons, to assist State and local communities in providing needed public services, and for other purposes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and ask unanimous consent that the time be taken out of both sides equally.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Who yields time?

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from California (Mr. MURPHY).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, as the ranking Republican on the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, I rise to urge the Senate to sustain the President's veto on the manpower bill. In this capacity, I have had a good vantage point from which to view the Nation's manpower effort. I have worried with our problems for the past 5 years in the hope of finding workable answers.

I have reached the same conclusion as has been reached by most of the country's manpower experts. Namely, that the present manpower program needs to be overhauled and redirected if we are to make certain that the taxpayers get a maximum return for their investments and that those who need help get our best effort, that the manpower programs do not create false hopes, but rather meaningful jobs at the end of the training period.

Because of the rapid growth of manpower programs in the last decade, each of these programs, it seems, was proposed to meet same emergency and in enacting the various programs, little thought was given as to how each new program would mesh with existing ones.

From time to time I got the feeling that one of the practices of which we have been accused, that where a problem arises, just throw some of the taxpayers' money at it and it will go away, was used too many times.

Dr. Jack Michie, director of the Oakland Skill Center, a few years ago testified before our subcommittee saying that if Federal restrictions and redtape were removed and greater flexibility were given to the skill centers, they could train 30 percent more trainees with the same amount of money and do a better job if they would just let us do it. The complete ridiculousness of the situation was driven home when Dr. Michie said they could not even legally transfer a typewriter on one project without a 6-month paperwork delay. We must do better.

The President has tried to make sense out of our present manpower programs, and so has the committees. Basically, what the President has sought to do is to decategorize the current manpower programs and decentralize their administration to State and local governments. The administration tries to give flexibility and freedom to the local and State governments so they can tailor their programs to meet the needs of their particular citizens rather than force State and localities to force citizens into categorical programs which may or may not be best suited for them.

In 1968 I offered the supplementary State program to provide States with some needed flexibility and freedom so that they could experiment and fill the gaps that existed in current manpower programs. This was needed in California to implement a completely bipartisan manpower package.

I was amazed when I found that both Governor Reagan and Democratic leader Jesse Unruh were in complete agreement on this. It made absolute sense. They wanted to put aside the redtape, the overlaps, and the competition and get it all under one umbrella so that we could find out what would work and would not work and approach the matter and get on with the job.

Unfortunately, although I was able to get the Senate to fund the program at the \$20 million level, the funds were subsequently dropped in a House-Senate conference.

My program on a very minor scale attempted to do for some States what the President intended to do nationwide. The President's manpower program is a vote of confidence in State and local officials. It recognizes that in a country as vast as the United States there are many differences among our communities and conditions and that is practically impossible to package programs in Washington to meet the differing needs of the countless communities clear across the country. I have confidence that in most communities and States they can do the job.

I find with respect to most of the elected representatives across the country under our system of government that if the people in those communities lose their confidence in those elected representatives, they replace them with some others. That is proper. That is the way it should be.

Unfortunately, the bill before the Senate today only partially meets these objectives. It does appear to give a little more responsibility to State and local governments, but it does not go far enough. It also increases the number of legislatively mandating manpower programs. Categorical programs, of course, means less freedom and less flexibility at the State and local levels.

It worries me, Mr. President, that we seemed to wish to give the appearance of putting the control at the local level without really letting go of it here in Washington. I remember a dialog I had one time with a gentleman with regard to the FEPC in California in which some lawyer from the Justice Department answered that in his opinion only lawyers from the Justice Department in Washington were capable of handling these programs properly. The third time he said it, he realized what a ridiculous statement he had made.

I also was concerned with the public service sector of the bill before the Senate. I recognize there are meaningful jobs in the public service sector of our economy and, therefore, I would fully support legitimate public service employment as a part of the spectrum of manpower development activities. For many participants, public service jobs must be linked to further training and opportunities to move into nonsubsidized public or private jobs.

Mr. President, in other words, that is so that they could actually have a chance with the specific proposal of the program and provide with a program so that they might advance to better jobs.

Moreover, linked to the manpower reform measures the service employment

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# Cloture On SST Rejected

## Nixon May Call New Congress To Work Jan. 3

By Spencer Rich

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate refused overwhelmingly yesterday to end the filibuster against the supersonic transport plane, but appeared on the verge of solving the Cambodia policy dispute that has held up \$70 billion in defense and foreign aid funds.

The developing compromise on the Cambodia issue was capped by a letter late yesterday from Secretary of State William P. Rogers to Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho).

The letter said "the administration's programs, policies and intentions in Cambodia in no way conflict" with language of the Senate-passed Cambodia-aid authorization bill barring use of any appropriated funds "to finance the introduction of U.S. ground troops into Cambodia or to provide U.S. advisers to or for Cambodian military forces in Cambodia."

Church said the letter "has been approved by the highest authority."

The critics of U.S. Indochina policy had been threatening to hold up Cambodia aid and other measures until the administration agreed specifically to accept the so-called "Cooper-Church" restrictions in the Cambodia aid authorization and to drop other legislative language that might nullify the Cooper-Church provisions.

Yesterday's apparent compromise solution—which must still receive final House and Senate approval and could meet some problems from House hawks—gives the administration its money and the doves the commitment they have been seeking.

### Cloture Rejected

The cloture vote on SST needed two-thirds to cut off the filibuster led by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.), who calls the plane a wasteful threat to the environment. Cloture was rejected, 48 to 43, falling 18 votes short and failing to receive even a simple majority.

Early in the day, senators said a compromise that could end the filibuster and help Congress adjourn for the year was in the works, but it fell through by day's end. Administration forces backing the SST funds laid down another cloture petition for a vote Tuesday.

The other major issue tying the Senate in parliamentary knots and holding up adjournment is the threatened series of filibusters against the 546-page Social Security-trade-welfare bill. It seemed little nearer solution yesterday despite a 65-to-15 Senate vote refusing to table (kill) the administration's embattled Family Assistance Plan, which is pending as a floor amendment to the big three-part bill.

White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said the President wants Congress to stay in session until it passes all needed appropriations bills and the Social Security—FAP package even if it takes round-the-clock sessions and keeps the Senate here until Jan. 3, when the current Congress automatically expires under the Constitution.

Ziegler said Mr. Nixon was considering forcing the new 92d Congress to convene immediately upon expiration of the current one. He could do this simply by refusing to sign the Congressional resolution

date for the new Congress.

Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), who told reporters earlier he doubted that the package or any part of it, as things now stand, can be enacted by Jan. 3, said that if the President insisted on it, he would keep the Senate in session Sundays and even New Year's and Christmas to allow a vote on Mr. Nixon's proposals. But he said 24-hour sessions were out.

With hundreds of amendments being readied on the three-part package by critics of various parts, with free-traders still threatening a filibuster to kill the restrictive trade provisions (several of which Mr. Nixon himself opposes) and with House Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills (D-Ark.) already having said he would not consider the whole package in one piece, few senators think the bill can be approved this year.

Senators are saying privately, also that the question of forcing the Senate to stay in session to work on a bill few believe can pass has become totally enveloped in politics.

Democrats say the President's insistence on the matter stems from a desire to pin blame for failure to reach a vote on the Democratic leadership, while others say the Democratic leadership has refused to put the bill aside precisely in order to avert being made the scapegoat.

The anti-SST filibuster arose because Senate conferees accepted \$210 million in the Transportation Department appropriations bill for the plane after the Senate earlier had voted, 52 to 41, to kill the SST altogether.

On the cloture vote, Sens. John Stennis (D-Miss.) and Alan Bible (D-Nev.), floor managers of the transport funds bill, as well as Southerners and small-state Republicans who favor the SST, all voted against invoking cloture as a matter of principle.

The right of unlimited debate is considered by many senators as the only protection for a minority against a tyrannical Senate majority.

After the vote, opponents and backers of the SST conferred in an attempt to reach a compromise. Proxmire and his allies reportedly offered a

would be continued at \$24 million a month (the current spending rate) for only two more months, and then the Senate would vote on the issue again in February and decide finally whether to kill the plane.

The leading SST backer, Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), from the state where the plane is built, refused to agree although Stennis and Bible were said to be amendable. Jackson was said to in-

sist on a funding guarantee through next June, though at a lower level than in the bill now before the Senate.

The Cambodia policy compromise—to which Church, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), defense funds subcommittee Chairman Allen J. Ellender (D-La.), Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) and House Appropriations Committee Chairman George Mahon (D-Texas) were said to agree, involved the following steps:

- Approval by House-Senate conferees and then final enactment of a \$544-million authorization bill, which contains \$255 million in permitted

spending for Cambodia arms and the Senate-passed Cooper-Church language on Cambodia policy now endorsed by Rogers.

- House and administration agreement to drop from the \$66.6 billion defense appropriations bill two House-added legislative provisos that Mansfield, Fulbright, Church, and others believed nullified the Cooper-Church language, and contended would give the President a free hand to take almost any military action he pleases in Southeast Asia on pretext of rescuing U.S. prisoners of war or easing withdrawal of U.S. troops from the area.

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• Administration and House agreement to include in long-dormant bill, authorizing foreign military sales credits, the same new Cooper-Church language as in the Cambodia aid bill. This bill would then be enacted.

In exchange, Fulbright would withdraw his attempt to block the \$2.5 billion foreign aid appropriation bill, because it contained \$200 million in military credit sales not yet authorized, and the \$2 billion general supplemental funds bill, because it contained the actual Cambodia aid cash when the authorization had not yet been finally passed.

Fulbright had charged that inclusion of these funds when proposed that the Paris peace not yet authorized was simply a "hawk" attempt to bypass his committee and thwart normal senatorial procedures.

While debating the SST and FAP yesterday, the Senate took time out to approve a resolution praising U.S. raiders who tried to rescue U.S. prisoners of war being held at Sontay, North Vietnam. The original language sponsored by Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kans.) was modified in committee because Fulbright contended it could have been interpreted as endorsing future raids as well.

In a floor speech, Mansfield talks concentrate on trying to secure release of U.S. prisoners in exchange for a timetable on final withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam — both events "to take place under the umbrella of a cease fire."

Meanwhile, pacifist David Dellinger told the Associated Press that he had talked with Communist negotiators Xuan Thuy and Mme. Nguyen Thanh Binh in Paris and had learned the Communists would insist on a date for complete U.S. withdrawal as a condition of any further prisoner releases.

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# GOP Leaders Move to Cut Off Filibuster on SST Funds

By Spencer Rich  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Republican leaders moved yesterday to choke off the Senate filibuster against the \$210 million appropriation for continued development of the supersonic transport.

Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.), backed by 18 other senators, filed a cloture petition to cut off the debate that is holding up a vote on the conference report on the Transportation Department appropriations bill, which contains the SST funds.

A vote on the petition will come at 11 a.m. Saturday.

If the needed two-thirds vote is obtained—which appears unlikely at present—each senator would be entitled to one more hour of debate, and then the Senate would take a final vote on the conference report.

While the Senate battled over the SST in the morning and the Social Security-Trade-Welfare bill in the afternoon, four major bills involving billions of dollars in military spending and foreign aid were being held up by a hardening fight over U.S. policy in Cambodia and the right of the Nixon administration to move without specific approval from Congress.

The key dispute involved restrictions on U.S. operations in Cambodia written into the President's special foreign aid authorization bill, which was passed by the Senate on Wednesday. Along with authority for \$544 million in aid, including \$255 million for arms to Cambodia, this bill specifies that neither U.S. ground combat troops nor military advisers shall be introduced into Cambodia. Sen. Gale W. McGee (D-Wyo.) said yesterday senators had been informed that the "Pentagon, the State Department and the White House are willing to accept" the restrictions.

The measure also specifies that approval of the arms aid shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to defend Cambodia.

This bill is already in dispute because Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee fears it will involve the United States too deeply in Cambodia and has not agreed to go to a conference with the House.

But a far larger controversy is in the wings because language in the \$66.6 billion appropriations bill for the Defense Department appears to contradict the restrictions in the Cambodia aid bill and, in effect, possibly nullify them.

The Defense Appropriations (R-Pa.), backed by 18 other proved by the House, has a special section providing funds to aid Southeast Asia "free world" forces. It states: "Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit support of free world or local forces in actions designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war."

Another section, forbidding introduction of ground troops into Cambodia, Laos or Thailand, also authorizes the President to take any action he wishes to promote "safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war."

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) and others say the Defense appropriation language negates the Cambodia aid bill language and permits the President to do virtually anything he pleases, even to attack North Vietnam in full force to secure the release of prisoners.

Fulbright, in a recent insertion in the Congressional Record, said that, according to Gen. Leroy K. Manor, who

commanded the Sontay prisoner raid, had stated he would not be opposed to landing "a division" or "an Army-size unit" in North Vietnam for prisoner rescue operations.

Mansfield and others are seeking some way to make sure that the language of the Cambodia aid bill—which some consider too weak because sponsors say it would permit small raids into Cambodia—prevails over the language of the Defense appro-

priations bill as a statement of federal policy.

A filibuster is possible to force the dropping or alteration of the Defense funds bill language, or at very least a floor statement from the bill's sponsors that the Cambodia aid language will be governing.

Two more bills are involved in this dispute. A general supplemental appropriation, carrying \$500 million in authorized aid to Israel, plus a compromise figure of \$495

million for Cambodia and several other countries, is stalled in conference. The Senate made the \$495 million appropriation contingent upon passage of the Cambodia authorization bill, which Fulbright has not yet taken to conference.

The Nixon administration at first was willing to retain this qualification because it expected Fulbright to go to conference on the authorization, but late yesterday it signalled

dropped so that the \$495 million can be spent without an authorization.

Finally, a \$2.5 billion appropriation for the regular foreign aid program may face a filibuster because conferees have included \$200 million for

foreign military sales without an authorization, and \$1.54 billion—also unauthorized—for the International Monetary Fund. Mansfield has complained bitterly about Senate conferees yielding on key provisions of Senate bills.

Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.), who is leading the filibuster against the SST funds called the Scott cloture petition a "ruthless parliamentary power play" and predicted it would be rejected. Proxmire

said SST backers had delayed a Senate vote for six months because they thought they would be stronger after November's elections, but now were arguing that the bill should be rushed through because time is short.

If the cloture move fails Saturday, SST backers would be in a position to file another one immediately and get a vote on it Monday, before Congress goes home for a five-day Christmas recess.

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# Cambodia Aid Vot By Sena

By Spencer Rich  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate passed the President's \$255 million Cambodia aid authorization by a 72-to-22 rollcall vote yesterday and headed into a series of tremendous fights that will keep it here for the remainder of the year.

Before passage, the Senate rejected, by a 61-to-33 rollcall, a plea by Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) to strike from the bill \$155 million in new Cambodia arms aid, in order to avoid any implication of a longterm U.S. commitment to defend or shore up the Cambodian government.

After the bill passed, Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) warned the senators that they face possible filibusters over at least five major issues. He said there would be double sessions for the rest of the year, and obtained unanimous consent to take up such issues as the SST appropriation from 9 to 3 each day, then put them aside for the rest of the day and consider other measures.

Mansfield also said the joint leadership was considering seeking debate-limiting motions to block some of the talkathons and speed up business, and would seek consent to reduce to two hours (instead of one-and-a-half days) the time between the filing of a cloture motion and the vote on it.

As things now stand, the Senate is expected to recess on Dec. 22 for Christmas, return Dec. 28 and possibly stay through New Year's Eve or Jan. 3—the constitutional expiration date of the 91st Congress. A resolution sent to the President yesterday would bring the 92d Congress into session on Jan. 21.

## AID, From A1

The Cambodia aid request was part of a \$500-million special foreign-aid authorization bill sought by Mr. Nixon. Of the Cambodia funds, \$100 million was to cover aid already advanced, and the remaining \$155 million to cover proposed new arms aid.

Gravel, with strong support from Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark) of the Foreign Relations Committee, argued that the bill constituted a congressional endorsement of the President's Cambodia policy and would appear as a long-term commitment to the Cambodian government, despite specific language in the measure—accepted by Mr. Nixon—barring introduction of U.S. troops or military advisers into Cambodia and specifically stating that aid should not be construed as a commitment

to Cambodia's rescue, enabling the government to maintain its present precarious position and eventually to drive the invaders from Cambodian territory."

• The "vast majority of new Cambodian military personnel have been or will be trained in South Vietnam and Thailand," in many cases by U.S. advisers.

• U.S. operations included close air support by U.S. troops of Cambodian soldiers in the field, gunship attacks and other quasi-combat operations. "In sum, most U.S. officials clearly felt that describing all U.S. operational air attacks as 'interdiction' was, purely and simply, 'camouflage,' as one official put it."

The report said at Long Hail a Vietnamese captain is "nominally" in command of training Cambodians, but U.S.

by the United States to defend that country.

"Approval of this money is equivalent to a treaty," Fulbright contended. "It will be treated in the future as a commitment to Cambodia."

Critics said arms aid could lead to deeper U.S. entanglement in Cambodia and another Vietnam.

To back his argument, Fulbright inserted into the record without discussion a report by two Foreign Relations Committee staff members Richard Moose and James Lowenstein, who visited Cambodia in December. The hitherto secret report concluded that:

• The Cambodian Army and Air Force are "completely dependent" on the United States for weapons; that it is "a universally held assumption" in Cambodia that the United States eventually "will come

soldiers actually were running the training operation.

The report concluded that sustaining Premier Lon Nol's government obviously would require a longterm U.S. arms aid commitment.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) disagreed with Gravel and Fulbright that approval of the Cambodia authorization would be a U.S. commitment. "We wrote the bill in such a way that we think it gives us statutory protection against Cambodia becoming another Vietnam," Church said, referring to the restrictions placed in the bill by the Foreign Relations Committee.

In the 61-to-33 vote on the Cambodia authorization, most Northern Democrats voted to cut it, as did Maryland's two senators. Both Virginia senators voted with Mr. Nixon.

Mansfield, in warning of

possible filibusters, called attention to one against the SST funds, which began late yesterday, to possible further disputes over the Cambodia funds and the big Social Security-Trade-Welfare package, and to the defense appropriations conference report, carrying \$66.6 billion, which passed the House yesterday.

Mansfield said language in the defense money bill barring introduction of U.S. troops into Laos, Thailand or Cambodia had been so watered down as possibly to permit U.S. strikes against North Vietnam to free U.S. prisoners.

Fulbright, moreover, threatened to filibuster the compromise foreign aid appropriation of \$2.5 billion, which passed the House yesterday, 199 to 151. He objects to the inclusion of \$200 million for credit sales of military equipment abroad.

*Cambodia*

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DATE

NEW YORK TIMES

## CONFEREES ALTER BAN ON TROOP USE

### Grant Leeway if Pullout in Vietnam Is Imperiled

By JOHN W. FINNEY  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 15—A House-Senate conference committee introduced a possible loophole today in the proposed legislative restraints on President Nixon's power to send combat ground troops to Cambodia.

The committee, which was convened to reconcile House and Senate differences on the \$66-billion defense appropriations bill, modified a restriction added in the Senate. The Senate version specified that none of the funds could be used by the President to send ground combat troops to Cambodia, Laos or Thailand.

But at the insistence of the House conferees and reportedly with Nixon Administration support, that provision was modified to make clear that it would not prevent the President from taking action in Cambodia, Laos or Thailand "designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war."

#### Incursion in Cambodia

After American ground troops were sent into Cambodia last May 1, the Administration said that one reason for the campaign had been to protect the withdrawal program by striking at suspected Communist supply bases. In view of this position, the reaction of some Senators, such as Senator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, was that the conference committee modification had "vitiated" the effectiveness of the restraints that the Senate has been seeking to impose on future military involvement in Cambodia.

While the conference committee was modifying the prohibition in the defense appropriations bill, the Senate was moving toward passage of a \$1-billion foreign aid authorization bill. This contains an amendment, voted yesterday by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee specifying that the President could not use aid funds to send American ground troops or military advisers to Cambodia.

The Senate was prepared to accept the amendment, which the Administration was not opposing. Immediate Senate action on the legislation was blocked, however, by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, a major foe of the Vietnam war. He protested that the Senate was moving with "undue haste" to endorse an "open-ended commitment" to the Cambodian Government.

#### Stennis in Exchange

By arrangement with the Administration, Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, sought to clarify the intent of the amendment in a floor exchange with Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, and a sponsor of the restrictions.

Senator Stennis asked if the amendment would prohibit the President, as Commander in Chief, from again sending in troops against suspected sanctuaries in Cambodia. Senator Church replied that the amendment would not prevent the President from undertaking "precautionary actions," such as "raids" or "lunges" across the Cambodian border to protect American troops. But, he continued, it would prevent the President from committing a substantial number of troops for an extended period in "a war in Cambodia" without obtaining Congressional approval.

Senator Stennis interpreted this to mean that the amendment "does not take away the responsibilities or power of the President to do what he thinks necessary to destroy armies, arsenals or anything else."

*Cambodia*

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*Defense Apps. Bill*  
DATE 16 Oct 70 PAGE 1

THE WASHINGTON POST

# Aid Bill Ties Up Senate

## 3 Members Delay Action On Cambodia

By Spencer Rich  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate plunged into a new debate on President Nixon's Cambodia policy yesterday that blocked consideration of the big Social Security-trade-welfare bill and tied the chamber, at least temporarily, into parliamentary knots.

Sens. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) and Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), together with Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), argued that a provision in a foreign aid supplemental authorization supplying \$155 million in new arms aid to Cambodia represents, in effect, a request for congressional sanction of what Gravel called an "unwise" and "open-ended commitment to a new regime in Southeast Asia."

Gravel moved to kill the \$155 million authorization (leaving in another \$100 million already spent on Cambodia by the President). Then he and Fulbright, contending they wished to air the issue at length so senators would know what they were really voting on, held the floor from before noon until after dark and refused to allow a vote despite pleas from Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.).

Meanwhile, House-Senate conferees on the ~~mobilization dollar~~ defense appropriation approved a final bill of \$66.6 billion, about \$2.1 billion less than the administration had sought.

The conferees watered down a Senate provision barring use of any of the funds for introducing American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand or Cambodia. They added language making clear that ~~nothing in this section should be construed as prohibiting the President from taking action in said areas designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war.~~

Senate backers of the original provision said the change appeared to open up some undesirable loopholes, making the provision substantially less binding than a similar restriction inserted in the foreign aid authorization measure, which, Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) said, had President Nixon's personal endorsement.

The aid authorization, as reported by the Foreign Relations Committee, bore provisions barring use of any of the funds for introduction of U.S. ground troops or military advisers into Cambodia, and stating specifically that U.S. military and economic assistance to Cambodia "shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to Cambodia by its defense."

Church said he had discussed this matter with Mr. Nixon at the White House Monday night and "the President told me . . . that he did not take exception to the action of the committee in writing in the restrictive language."

Recalling that last spring, during the Cambodia action the White House had opposed similar language, Church said "We have won our fight for White House recognition that except in certain emergency conditions, congressional assent was needed before the President could send troops to another country for ground combat."

Under questioning from Armed Services Committee Chairman John C. Stennis (Miss.), Church said the Foreign Relations Committee's

language clearly barred a lengthy, large-scale invasion of Cambodia by the United States, but would allow minor rescue operations and "precautionary action" to protect U.S. troops in the field in South Vietnam.

As for another action of the scope and duration of the six-

week Cambodia operation of last spring, Church refused to say absolutely whether that would be permitted by the new language. Permissible strikes are "strictly limited to actions restricted both in scope and in time and . . . directly related to protection of American troops in the field," he said, adding that he couldn't pledge that the language "would not preclude an invasion of Cambodia on the scale and for the length of time that took place last summer."

"An incursion there would be all right, but an invasion no," said committee member George D. Aiken (R-Vt.).

Supporters of the bill repeatedly cited the statements of Mr. Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers that the United States had no intention of waging a ground war in Cambodia.

"Up to this point we've had a presidential policy (of aid to Cambodia)," said Gravel. "If we vote these funds today, we now make it a congressional policy, a national policy."

Fulbright and Gravel argued that regardless of the restrictive language in the supplemental authorization bill, approval of the \$155 million in new funds for Cambodia would be taken as a commitment to support the Cambodian regime which could eventually widen into direct U.S. intervention.

Administration stalwart Bob Dole (R-Kan.) shot back, "If I had a choice, I'd rather send dollars than more American men," and argued that by providing arms aid, the United

States would be able to withdraw its own troops.

Church, citing the President's record in withdrawing troops from Vietnam ("average withdrawal has proceeded at the rate of 2,500 a week for nearly two years"), said the restrictive language inserted by the committee would assure "that Cambodia will not become another Vietnam."

The bill before the Senate would authorize \$535 million in special foreign aid requests, including the \$155 million in new funds for Cambodia, and \$100 million to restore funds already spent for Cambodia.

Sen. John J. Williams (R-Del.) proposed language adding Israel to the countries from which U.S. ground troops were barred, but this was tabled (killed), 66 to 20.

Williams called his proposal consistent with the spirit of requiring the President to seek congressional authority for new commitments, but Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) said the bill didn't deal with Israel and the proposal would upset Mideast peace efforts.

While the dispute raged over the authorization bill, the Transportation Department funds bill, containing \$210 million for the supersonic transport, and the huge Social Security package, were held from the floor.

If the Social Security measure ever gets there, supporters of the administration's embattled Family Assistance Plan are planning to object to adoption of the Finance Committee's amendments and will move immediately to add family assistance on a floor vote on the first provision read. They said parliamentary objections had been cleared up, and the leadership had promised to help in this maneuver.

In the defense appropriations conference, conferees settled on \$18 million for the "Freedom Fighter" airplane for which the Senate had cut all funds; approved \$200 million for financially troubled Lockheed Aircraft Corp. to continue work on the C-5A military transport, and provided \$188.5 million for procurement of one submarine and advance work on another. The House had voted \$417.5 million for destroyers, submarines and tenders; the administration had sought no funds for them, and the Senate provided none.

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NEW YORK TIMES

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

## SENATE UNIT BACKS AID FOR CAMBODIA, BUT BARS TROOPS

Foreign Relations Committee  
Also Asserts That Funds  
Are Not a Commitment

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 14 — The Senate Foreign Relations Committee today approved the Administration's \$255-million program of military aid for Cambodia but with a restriction prohibiting the President from sending American ground troops or advisers to Cambodia.

The committee also stipulated that the aid should not be interpreted as a commitment by the United States to defend the Cambodian Government.

These restrictions, which apparently are acceptable to the executive branch, were incorporated by the committee in an amendment attached to a bill passed by the House, authorizing \$535-million in supplementary military and economic aid for several countries in Asia and the Middle East.

### Restoration of Funds Sought

The most controversial item in the Administration's package is a request for \$85-million in military aid and \$70-million in economic aid for Cambodia, plus restoration of \$100-million for military aid funds previously transferred to the Government of Premier Lon Nol.

The authorization measure for foreign aid is scheduled to be considered by the Senate tomorrow. With the Administration apparently prepared to accept the Foreign Relations Committee's restrictive amendment, the bill is expected to be approved quickly by the Senate and then accepted in a Senate-House conference committee.

Another foreign aid measure, this one an appropriations bill, was approved by the Senate today. The \$2-billion supplemental appropriations bill contained \$1.03-billion in aid funds requested by the Administration, including \$500-million for military credit sales to Israel. The Israeli funds have already been authorized by Congress, but the appropriations bill specified that the other funds cannot be spent until they have been authorized in separate legislation.

The committee amendment, adopted by a unanimous voice vote, was offered by Senator John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, and Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, and co-sponsored by Senator Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York, Senator George D. Aiken, Republican of Vermont, Senator Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey, and Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana and the majority leader.

In its essential features, the amendment corresponds to the Cooper-Church Amendment on Cambodia, which was resisted by the Administration when the Senate attached it last summer to a bill on foreign military sales. Because of Administration opposition to the amendment, the military sales bill has since become deadlocked in a Senate-House conference committee.

But this time the Administration is apparently prepared to accept a modified version of the Cooper-Church Amendment as the price it must pay for getting the foreign aid authorization legislation through Congress.

Senator Cooper said that he had advised "high sources" in the Administration that the restrictive amendment would be offered and that "thus far there have been no objection."

Another indication of the Administration's willingness to accept the amendment—while not openly endorsing it—was a telephone call Saturday from Secretary of State William P. Rogers to Senator Javits. In that call, according to Senate sources, Mr. Rogers in effect accepted restrictive language and in turn asked Senator Javits's help in getting the legislation out of the Foreign Relations Committee.

In part, Mr. Rogers's attitude seemed to be influenced by a

debate going on in the Administration over whether to bypass the Foreign Relations Committee on future legislation on military aid. Mr. Rogers was said to have told Senator Javits that the State Department, in its argument with the Defense Department, wanted to work through the Foreign Relations Committee and that its case would be greatly strengthened if the committee would send to the Senate the emergency foreign aid legislation requested by President Nixon in mid-November.

The amendment approved today does not, in effect, place any Congressional restrictions on the Administration, which has emphasized that the aid program did not represent a defense commitment to the Cambodian Government and that there were no plans to send advisers or combat troops to Cambodia.

Thus the Administration was in a position where it could accept the amendment and the Cooper-Church forces could say that they had established the principle that the President

should not commit the nation to a war in Cambodia without the consent of Congress.

Two provisions opposed by the Administration were eliminated from the original Cooper-Church Amendment. One would have prohibited the United States from contracting with third countries—such as Thailand or South Vietnam—to provide military advisers or troops to Cambodia; the other would have prohibited the United States from providing combat air support for Cambodian troops.

*Cambodia*

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THE EVENING STAR

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# Fulbright Panel Okays Funds For Cambodia

By GEORGE SHERMAN  
Star Staff Writer

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee today agreed to authorize President Nixon's proposal for \$255 million in aid to Cambodia, but coupled the action with severe restrictions.

Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, after a two-hour closed meeting, said that the committee had agreed to report out the full \$535 million new foreign aid authorization requested last month by the President—including the \$255 million for Cambodia.

But he said the committee had unanimously adopted three different amendments:

An amendment similar to the previous "Cooper-Church" amendment forbidding the introduction of American combat forces, advisers or instructors into Cambodia.

An amendment by Sen. Jacob Javits, R-N.Y., stating that the added funds in no way signal a American commitment "to the defense of Cambodia."

An amendment by Sens. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., and Clifford Case, R-N.J., that if the President decides to switch any more funds from existing aid programs to Cambodia, he must give Congress 30-day advance notice.

## Reflects Hostility

The last amendment reflects hostility in the committee, led by Chairman J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., to the fact that Nixon has given \$108 million in aid to Cambodia over the last seven months without approval of Congress. He did this by an "emergency" switch of funds from already approved air programs.

The committee split on two votes on the package.

First, Sen. Symington's proposal to delete all funds for Cambodia from the package was defeated 8 to 4. Fulbright voted in favor of the deletion.

The actual vote on reporting out the entire package Appraised For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000200250001-9

Under the new amendment the President would have to give 30-day prior notice, but "in case of an emergency," said Church, this period could be whittled down to 10 days.

Church said that the committee had "indications" from the administration that the President will accept these restrictions. He refused to go into detail.

## Follow-Up Comments

But he did say that there had been a "follow-up" from Secretary of State William P. Rogers' remarks to the committee last week that he did not have a "closed mind" against possible restrictions.

The \$255 million authorization approved today for Cambodia includes \$100 million to restore funds already taken from other aid programs for use in Cambodia, \$85 million in new military aid, and \$70 million in economic aid. In addition, the administration proposes to send another \$30 million from Food for Peace funds.

By acting today, the committee forestalled attempts by administration forces to bypass the authorization stage for the new aid. The House has already passed the full appropriation requested without provision that it first be authorized by Congress. That total package is \$1.035 billion, including \$335 million military credits for Israel, which had previously been authorized in this session of Congress.

There were indications that administration forces would try

See CAMBODIA, Page A-3

a similar maneuver, bypassing the authorization stage in the Senate, where a similar appropriations bill including the \$1.035 billion supplemental foreign aid request is being debated today.

Church noted that the committee has now blocked this "end-

run" by voting out its own version of the \$335 million—including Cambodia—which still had to be authorized in the \$1.035 billion Presidential aid package.

Church said today the committee is "determined that we do not repeat the pattern of Vietnam," where economic and mili-

tary aid was the first step toward deep American military involvement.

The administration has repeatedly denied any intention of sending troops or advisers to Cambodia. At his press conference on Thursday Nixon said he could see no circumstances whatsoever for sending American forces back into Cambodia.

## Don't Prohibit Flights

Church today said that the adopted amendments do not prohibit the use of American air power over Cambodia. Nor is there any reference, he said, against using the money to support forces of other neighboring Asian nations—so called "mercenaries"—in Cambodia.

Church said American air power is already being used in Cambodia, and including prohibition of it in this aid package would only complicate the argument on the floor of the Senate. He also noted that South Vietnamese forces are already fighting in Cambodia, and the committee does not want to jeopardize American aid to these forces by an anti-mercenary amendment.

Church said the committee has been under heavy pressure to act. By reporting out the authorization today, even with the restrictions, it effectively bypassed Fulbright's plan to stall the new Cambodian aid until the next season of Congress.

Fulbright had argued that up to \$250 million in existing aid could be channeled to Cambodia in the same way the \$108 million already has been, without new congressional authorization. But on Friday, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird strongly disagreed, saying that "we have run out of money."

December 8, 1970

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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the other day, ought to be of Wilbur Mills. For if the European Economic Community grows in size and cohesion and economic and political power over the next decade, Mr. Mills and his trade bill will deserve some of the credit.

That little irony is one way of measuring the unwitting self-destructive effects that are likely if the Mills bill or something like it becomes law. The United States will be doing the most effective single thing it could possibly do to build up a rival economic power in the world—and to make it more antagonistic.

Now the sophisticated men and women who inhabit the ugly new maze that is E.E.C. headquarters here are much too smart to think that Wilbur Mills is a primitive tyrant. They know that he is a shrewd legislator whose bill reflects genuine forces in the United States.

They know that these are hard times in America, that there is a climate of economic fear. They know that protectionism is not going to be dispelled by hope or even logic.

The Europeans have had enough experience with entrenched economic forces in their own community to understand that particular American regional or industrial interests, with political weight, really feel threatened by free trade. But they expect more of national leadership, and they wonder whether Washington appreciates the dangers of protectionism.

Consider the question of enlarging the Common Market to include Britain and the other applicant countries. American Establishment opinion, long favoring that enlargement, has turned a little sour at the edges lately because of the E.E.C.'s tough trade tactics. But it still tends to favor Britain's entry, on the ground that she will hopefully make the market less selfish, more outward-looking.

Passage of the Mills bill would propel the E.E.C. enlargement negotiations toward a successful conclusion. The specter of American protectionism would incline even the doubters inside the market to want a larger, stronger community.

The psychology of a community enlarged under those impulses is likely to be defensive. The momentum will be toward division of the world into trade blocs.

The retaliatory mood in Brussels is already evident. The reaction to the Mills bill is not so much fearful as determined. And the talk is not only of specific retaliation against sensitive American products. You keep out our shoes and textiles, we'll keep out your vegetable oil.

There is the broader and more dangerous possibility of the E.E.C. trying to undercut whole markets for American products by preferential trade agreements. Those agreements, for mutual trade advantages, have so far been made only with countries in the Mediterranean area, where U.S. trade interests are not so large. Suppose the community should now seek agreements in Latin America? Or suppose it should move toward restrictions on American investments in Europe?

Some Americans may still be thinking, "They can't do that to us." But they can. The European community is now a significant economic power, second only to the United States. And it is growing—a gain of 7 per cent in gross product last year over the year before, compared with less than 3 per cent in the U.S.

With the applicant countries in, the E.E.C. would have a population of more than 250 million.

We have learned, latterly, that the United States cannot have its own way in the world militarily or politically. There are other people with power, and we have to deal with them.

The same is true economically: We have tremendous firepower, but in any conflict we

are going to be hurt ourselves. The textile manufacturer in South Carolina may not care about that; so long as he is protected, he may think, it's just too bad about the farmer down the road. But the understanding and the responsibility ought to be greater in Washington.

Mr. JAVITS. Finally Mr. President, I would like to return to Secretary Stans December 1 speech in which he stated:

The fundamental point to realize about this bill is the fact that on every major issue it delegates responsibility to the President to act. This being so, the concern should not be with the law itself, but with the way it will be administered if it becomes law.

I would point out that the greatness of this Nation is based on the fact that it is a nation in which the rule of law is supreme. If we pass bad laws with the hope that the administration of them will be benevolent we will have taken a long step toward weakening the separation of powers and in turn our democracy. I would also point out that the Senate has had experience with delegation of authority to the executive that rightfully belongs in the Congress to the President. I remember some rather bitter struggles in this regard and again it was in the foreign policy field. I hope my colleagues will not find me remiss or not find my rhetoric inflammatory if I again characterize this bill as the "Tonkin Gulf Resolution" in the trade field.

## OKLAHOMA'S 4-H CLUB DELEGATION TO THE NATIONAL 4-H CONGRESS

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, for years, Oklahoma youths have made an impressive showing in the National 4-H Club Congress. This year Oklahoma's delegation compiled a truly outstanding record by winning a total of 21 national awards, more than any other State, and the most honors ever won in the 49-year history of the congress.

Oklahoma's delegates to the meeting in Chicago last week also won an unprecedented \$12,200 in scholarships, the most money ever taken home by a single State.

Topping the list of achievements were three Presidential awards. This is the highest honor which can be given a 4-H Club member in the National, and Oklahoma won half of the six awards. This is the first time in the history of the congress that half of the awards went to members from one State.

In addition to these recordbreaking accomplishments, Clayton Taylor, president of Oklahoma's 60,000 4-H'ers, was chosen as one of five members of the team of 4-H reporters to the Nation for 1971. The team will visit national leaders, businessmen, and civic organizations throughout the Nation to explain new trends and developments in the 4-H program.

This year's 39-member delegation from Oklahoma surpassed a previous record of 19 national winners set in 1964. Ray Parker of Oklahoma State University, a member of the State 4-H Club staff, said he had never witnessed a more enthusi-

astic, ambitious group of youthful Oklahomans. Another 4-H Club leader, Dr. Pete Williams of Stillwater, Okla., said the amazing record was possible because of long hours and devotion by hundreds of adult leaders across the State, as well as the parents and others who take the time to give these young people encouragement and help them.

As one whose family has been closely involved with 4-H work for many years, I have a great appreciation for the opportunities provided by this organization for guiding young lives into useful and enjoyable activities. And while I share with all Oklahomans the feeling of pride for the performance of our young people at Chicago this year, there is also an inspiration for all Americans in their accomplishments.

These young men and women, who come from communities of all sizes and from different family backgrounds, will join the ranks of tomorrow's leaders in this Nation. The training and experience they have gained from the 4-H program and the sense of achievement through individual effort will equip them well for the challenges they must face.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the list of Oklahoma's 21 national 4-H winners be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## LIST OF 4-H WINNERS

Clayton Taylor, Oktaha, top 4-H boy for leadership and presidential award.

Latrice Baker, Cater, top 4-H girl for citizenship and presidential award.

Larry Mark Shockey, Chickasha, top 4-H boy for citizenship and presidential award.

Gwen Etta Shaw, Darlington, consumer education and home economics.

John Lawler, Orlando, agriculture.

Tony Engelke, Amber, Automotive project.

Vicki Hutchens, Tishomingo, dress review.

Jimmie Williams, Smithville, electrical project.

Cathy Bennett, Guthrie, sheep project.  
Alane LeGrand, Stillwater, health.

Denise Welson, Carrier, food nutrition.

Jane Mayer, Hooker, women's achievement.

John Roush, Cherokee, men's achievement.

Randy DuBois, Grove, veterinary science.

Ted Weber, Carmen, swine training.

Yvonne Moore, Ninnekah, food preservation.

Janet Johnson, Mulhall, bicycle program.

Bill Stasyszen, Tecumseh, overall 4-H achievement.

Lanny Bates, Ada, overall 4-H achievement.

Roellen Gentry, Shawnee, overall 4-H achievement.

Lou Ann Schiltz, Ponca City, overall 4-H achievement.

Payne County team of Jim Hiner, Barbara Knorr, Cora Ann LeGrand, and Duane Williams, all of Stillwater, won first place in poultry judging.

## CAMBODIA

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, this morning in executive session the Foreign Relations Committee heard an interesting and informative report on Cambodia from two staffmen—Messrs. James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose. They have just returned from a factfinding

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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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mission to that country on behalf of the committee.

The Lowenstein-Moose report is by far the clearest statement I have heard of the story on Cambodia. It provides indispensable background for decisions the Senate is shortly going to have to make with regard to U.S. aid programs in Cambodia, and the deeper U.S. involvement which would inevitably follow.

Unfortunately, the report is highly classified. It could be declassified in major part, and I think that should be done. Every Senator should have the benefit of the information it contains before he votes on the supplemental aid authorization for Cambodia.

The American people also are entitled to know where we are going and why.

## WHAT THE AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION PROGRAM MEANS TO FARMERS

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, for some years I have observed firsthand what the agricultural conservation program means to farmers and the great influence it has had in restoring our national landscape. I have seen ravaged land become a place of beauty. I have seen burned over forests become green with pine and gullied hillsides flourish with clover. These improvements as well as maintenance of our basic natural resources of soil and water, can in many cases be attributed to the work of the ACP. I find it very regrettable that a program which has served us so well, and one with such outstanding prospects for future service, may be eliminated.

For many years the ACP has encouraged farmers to plant green cover crops to protect the soil and control erosion, to construct terraces and plant in contour strips, construct dams, pits, and ponds, plant trees and shrubs, construct sod waterways, and install farmland drainage systems. While the main emphasis behind these practices has been toward more productive farming, we now find that these same agricultural practices have been effective in controlling agricultural pollution. As ranking Republican member of the Committee on Public Works, I am working with the problems of water and air pollution and solid waste disposal, over which my committee has legislative jurisdiction. It is my belief that the ACP is an ongoing program which can be of great value in helping to solve the problems of agricultural pollution.

On February 10, 1970, in a message to the Congress on environmental problems, the President stated:

Water pollution has three principal sources: municipal, industrial, and agricultural wastes. All three must eventually be controlled if we are to restore the purity of our lakes and rivers. Of all these three, the most troublesome to control are those from agricultural sources: animal wastes, eroded soil, fertilizer and pesticides. Some of these are nature's own pollutions.

With the ACP we have in full operation a program which is dealing effectively with these problems which the President placed so high on his own list of priorities. To abandon the ACP at a

time when it is successfully fighting one of our most pressing national problems, is unthinkable.

It seems obvious to me that if the ACP is not continued, it will be necessary to create a new program to combat agricultural pollution and agricultural conservation. I later find it difficult to understand the rationale behind the discontinuance of an established, effective, low cost program for a new and untried program which could be plagued with organizational and implementation difficulties. Apparently, many of those who would discontinue the ACP are not fully aware of the services it now provides and the necessity for an expansion of these services.

The Congress has recently voted to limit commodity payments to \$55,000 per farm in response to growing concern about large payments that go to a small number of large farm operators. The ACP does not suffer such criticism because payments are limited to a fraction of that amount. The national average of ACP payments is about \$200 and has broad participation nationwide. I know of no program which better lends itself to support of the small family farm with such broadly distributed benefits.

I believe it is a real paradox that at a time when there is so much concern about ecology and the problems of our environment, that an established program which has helped not only farmers, but has resulted in restoring natural beauty and enhancing the environment, should be abandoned or reduced. It is my hope that the President will direct the Bureau of the Budget to announce the ACP for 1971 so that farmers may enter their requests for participation.

Mr. President, I have written to the President and Secretary of Agriculture Hardin expressing my thinking on this subject. I ask unanimous consent that these letters as well as the reply I have received from Secretary Hardin be inserted into the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OCTOBER 26, 1970.

THE PRESIDENT,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I hope very much that funds will soon be released so that the 1971 Agricultural Conservation Program may be announced, and farmers can make application for ACP participation, as in previous years.

I have seen the results of the ACP in Kentucky—gullied slopes now in clover; farm ponds; multi-flora rose fence rows, fields once brown now green. I believe the ACP has done a great deal to restore the natural beauty of rural areas, and to maintain our basic national resources of soil and water. At a time when there is much concern about ecology and the environment, I believe it would be a mistake to abandon or sharply reduce the program.

Second, farm commodity programs have been increasingly criticized because of large payments to a small number of operations, so that the Administration this year recommended and the Congress adopted a \$55,000 per farm limitation. But the ACP has for many years been limited to a fraction of that amount, and the average payment is around \$200 per farm. With the possible exception

of the county agent system, I know of no farm program which better lends itself to support for the family farm, or which in fact has provided such broadly distributed benefits.

While it is true that the Soil Conservation Service provides essential technical assistance to farmers, I doubt it would be so effective on many smaller and family farm operations without the incentive provided by the ACP for them to undertake the long-run conservation measures.

I do not say that the ACP should not be redirected. Rather, the program lends itself to different local needs and revised national priorities. For example, agricultural pollution abatement practices, to be carried out through the ACP, have recently been developed and are being encouraged by the Department of Agriculture.

To this point, I may say that my early experience with, and strong support for, the ACP came during the years I served as a member of the Committee on Agriculture. Now, as the ranking Republican member of the Committee on Public Works, I find myself working on the problems of water and air pollution and solid waste disposal, over which that Committee has legislative jurisdiction. I am sure that agricultural sources of pollution will require increasing attention next year and in the years to come. With the ACP, it seems to me we have a program which can deal effectively with a number of these problems.

I should think it much better to redirect the ACP program, with increasing emphasis on pollution control, than to try to bring forward a new program to deal with farm sources of pollution.

I say that because new programs take time, organization, involve additional authorizations and expenditures, and in this case might lack the effectiveness of the ACP, which already has acceptance in the Congress and in the country.

I know you are familiar with the Agricultural Conservation Program as it has worked for many years. However, because a decision now about the future of the ACP involves not only the continuation of soil and water conservation practices on thousands of farms, but also the development and application of effective anti-pollution measures in the years ahead, I thought you would like to have and wanted to present my views for your consideration at this time.

With kind regards, I am  
Yours sincerely,

JOHN SHERMAN COOPER.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,  
Washington, D.C., November 18, 1970.  
Hon. JOHN SHERMAN COOPER,  
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR COOPER: This is in further reply to your letter of October 21, 1970, urging the release of funds for the Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP). We should also like to comment on your letter to the President of October 26, a copy of which you sent to us, expressing the hope that it might be helpful.

No final decision has been made to announce a 1971 program. However, we are continuing our discussions with the Office of Management and Budget on this matter and are hopeful that a decision on the program can be reached soon.

There is, of course, a serious problem in determining the items of sufficiently high priority for inclusion in the budget at a time of increasing demand for needed programs. The budgetary pressure and the lower priority assigned to the ACP have led to the difficulty in getting this program released.

As you point out, however, the ACP has been recently redirected to make it a more effective program and to better meet today's environmental and conservation problems.

*Cambodia*

NEW YORK TIMES

## NEW CURB SOUGHT ON DEFENSE CURBS

Senate Group Votes Bar to  
Use of G.I.'s in Cambodia

By JOHN W. FINNEY  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 3—The Senate Appropriations Committee today voted in favor of barring the President from using defense funds to introduce American ground combat troops into Cambodia.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee, meanwhile, refused to attach a similar restriction on legislation authorizing the President to provide \$255-million in military assistance to Cambodia.

The surprise move by the Senate committee came as it reported out for Senate action next week a \$68.7-billion defense appropriations bill that was \$2.3-billion less than requested by the Administration and \$388-million less than approved by the House. To the appropriations bill, the committee attached a legislative prohibition reading:

"In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by this act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground troops into Laos, Thailand and Cambodia."

### Curb Certain of Adoption

In view of the action of the conservative-dominated Appropriations Committee, the Cambodian restriction is certain to be adopted by the Senate. But even with Senate approval, there would remain a question whether the restriction would be accepted by House conferees in a Senate-House conference on the appropriations bill.

In a memorandum submitted to the House committee, the State Department opposed an amendment submitted by Representative Paul Findley, Republican of Illinois, which specified that the funds for Cambodia "shall be used exclusively for purposes the President determines to be essential to the withdrawal of United States military personnel from South Vietnam and in no case shall be used to establish or maintain United States military personnel in Cambodia."

The memorandum said, "It is bad policy to seek by legislative action to restrict the power of the Commander in Chief on matters which clearly come under his constitutional authority."

The memorandum added, "The Administration does not plan to send military advisers or combat personnel to Cambodia." It continued, "However, any such operational limitations ought to be self-imposed by the executive. Congress should not attempt to force them on the President through statute."

"Furthermore," the memorandum said, "adoption of such an amendment would no doubt have a seriously adverse psychological effect on the Government of Cambodia."

### Curbs Written Into Bill

With Administration approval, the restrictions against use of ground combat troops in Thailand and Laos were written into the Defense Bill last year and continued this year in the new appropriations bill approved by the House. The principal reason that Cambodia was not included originally in the list was because at the time that country was neutral and there was no overriding concern in Congress that American troops might be used there.

In now deciding to add Cambodia to the restrictions, Senator Allen J. Ellender, Democrat of Louisiana, the acting committee chairman, made clear that the purpose of the committee was to avoid another Senate floor fight on the Cambodian issue.

In its thrust, the Cambodian restriction corresponds to the Cooper-Church Amendment which the Senate attached to the first foreign military-sales bill. The bill has since become deadlocked in a House-Senate conference committee because of the refusal of the Administration and the House Foreign Affairs Committee to accept the amendment cosponsored by Senators John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, and Franch Church, Democrat of Idaho.

Following Administration wishes, the House committee rejected the Findley Amendment by a 18-9 vote. By overwhelming votes, the committee also defeated amendments by Representatives Donald M. Fraser, Democrat of Minnesota, and Jonathan B. Bingham, Democrat of New York, that would have reduced the aid amounts for Cambodia or made clear that the aid did not represent an American commitment to the Cambodian Government.

The Administration's attitude on the Senate committee's restriction was not immediately disclosed. But in the House, the Administration was making clear that it was opposed to any comparable legislative restrictions on the military aid it has requested for Cambodia.

THE WASHINGTON POST

DATE 20 Nov 70 PAGE 1

# Cambodia

## Aid Hit by Hill Doves

By Murrey Marder  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Senate "doves" aired quick misgivings about "another Vietnam" yesterday over President Nixon's \$255 million aid request for Cambodia. Administration spokesmen labeled the choice "dollars or blood."

That double reaction to the most controversial portion of the President's call for \$1.035 billion in new foreign military and economic assistance around the world appeared to end the Senate's verbal cease-fire on U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. President Nixon's Oct. 7 call for a battlefield cease-fire in all Indochina had produced a relative lull in the domestic political controversy in the 1970 election campaign.

War critics on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee served notice that they will scrutinize very carefully the President's multiplied request for help to Cambodia, where the war has continued to spread since U.S. troops withdrew last June.

"We're not going to stall," Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) said, but "this is so similar to the way we became involved in Vietnam."

Said committee member Frank Church (D-Idaho): "What we're really trying to do is to avoid another Vietnam in Cambodia."

The committee, after meeting yesterday, announced it is sending two staff investigators to Cambodia for inquiries to last a week to 10 days.

Senate Republican Leader Hugh Scott (Pa.) told news men yesterday that aid to Cambodia is vital to permit continued U.S. troop withdrawals from South Vietnam

See AID, A16, Col. 1

### AID, From A1

"The choice here is between dollars and blood," said Scott. Church's counter to that was, "Remember that dollars led to blood in South Vietnam."

Assistant Senate Republican Leader Robert P. Griffin (R-Mich.) said the President's overall supplemental request for aid to Asian countries is a "small price" to pay to "encourage the desirable maximum in self-help" by friendly nations.

Scott pointedly underscored the administration's intention to put pressure on the critics of its Indochina policy by trying to keep the funds for Cambodia tied in an appropriation package which includes \$500 million in arms credits for Israel.

"If they want aid to Israel," said Scott, "they had better support the whole bill." He said: "A vote against this bill will be a vote against Israel." Fulbright countered that he sees "no connection" between the two.

Scott added another factor to the looming debate, charging, "The real situation is that various people with presidential aspirations have no issue in this session unless they can

revive Cambodia—which they may try to do."

One potential aspirant, Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.), countered, "The question we ought to raise is whether we should give either blood or dollars to these dictatorial governments in Southeast Asia."

Fulbright and Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (Mont.) both promised a fair hearing for the administration's justification. Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, who appeared with their deputies before a group of congressmen in a closed meeting Wednesday to explain the request, are both expected to testify later in open session before Fulbright's committee. No date has been set.

A Senate Appropriations subcommittee headed by Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) will conduct hearings on the appropriations portion of the request, Senate aides said, but it may not reach it before "early December." The \$500 million arms credit for Israel already has gone through the authorization process, but not the supplemental funds for Cambodia and other nations. While it is the administra-

tion's intent to use the political appeal of arms credits for Israel to "pull along" the Cambodian funds, Senate specialists point out that it might be necessary in the end to split off the already-authorized Israeli credits anyhow, if the Cambodian request is blocked in this short, "lame duck" session of Congress.

Administration officials provided clarification yesterday of the sums involved in U.S. aid to Cambodia. Originally, after the overthrow of Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk Mar. 18, the United States sent \$8.9 million in American arms aid to Cambodia, appropriated out of funds from the last fiscal year.

Now, officials said, the administration is planning to send \$285 million more in military and economic aid to Cambodia during the current fiscal year. Of this sum, \$30 million is in surplus foods authorized under Public Law 480.

The Cambodian funds now being requested include \$155 million in new funds to be directly authorized to Cambodia for military and economic aid, plus \$100 million "borrowed" from military authorizations for other countries. Out of that \$100 mil-

lion, officials said, \$40 million was allotted earlier to Cambodia; Congress was notified Wednesday that another \$50 million is now going to Cambodia, and the remaining \$10 million is to be released for Cambodia in the months ahead.

THE EVENING STAR

DATE 1/10/70PAGE 1**DAVID LAWRENCE**

## Cambodia Thrust Had to Be Secret

When American troops moved into Cambodia, members of the House of Representatives introduced 17 bills trying to tell the President of the United States — already engaged in a major war operation — exactly how he should have proceeded.

They didn't know the confidential information he possessed about the "sanctuaries" of the enemy or the real reasons for the movement our troops suddenly launched as a military necessity.

Now—strange as it may seem — the House of Representatives, by a vote of 288 to 39, has passed a resolution declaring that the President should consult Congress "whenever feasible" before involving the forces of the United States in armed conflict. Even when it isn't "feasible," the House feels he should "promptly" report to Congress why he took such a step.

The new resolution by itself is believed harmless by its critics and is expected to pass the Senate. Rep. Clement J. Zablocki, Democrat of Wisconsin, chief sponsor of the resolution, says he is sure the administration will not object to it.

He declares, however, that the measure is important as expressing "the sense of Congress" that it wishes to be informed at all times about the "commitment" of U.S. troops.

While the new resolution does not mention the Cambodian action of a few months ago, it obviously is related to the strategic move made to destroy enemy bases and inflict a severe blow on the power of the North Vietnamese.

Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam, who is visiting in this country, told the students at the West Point Military Academy the other day that the Cambodian incursion had forced the Viet Cong to resort to low-level guerrilla warfare. He said "they are back to where they were ten years ago."

Military experts say that the destruction of the Communist bases in Cambodia was one of the most telling actions of the whole Vietnam war and, indeed, may prove to have been the turning point.

Yet, while it was going on, some members of Congress were condemning the administration for allegedly violating its pledge not to make any more commitments abroad except with the consent of Congress.

The declaration of the President of the United States that the mission was temporary was viewed with skepticism, and efforts were made in Congress to pass resolutions seeking to limit the presence of our troops in Cambodia.

The expedition was completed successfully and American forces were withdrawn within the time set by the administration.

The current resolution reminds the President that only Congress has the power to declare war, but notes that Congress allows "the President in certain extraordinary and emergency circumstances" to defend the United States and its citizens "without specific prior authorization by the Congress."

The reason for this is that the Constitution itself makes the President commander-

in-chief of the armed forces of the nation.

He could not possibly operate them effectively if he had to reveal in advance to 535 congressmen all the secrets obtained about enemy "sanctuaries," thus telling our adversaries exactly when and where they would be attacked.

The Cambodian incursion achieved its object because it was a surprise attack. Even many officials inside the administration weren't told prior to the act.

The secret had to be kept to prevent the North Vietnamese from finding out about the plan and preparing to defend themselves in the areas where they had assembled their supplies.

When the history of the Vietnam war comes to be written, the Cambodian expedition will prove to have been one of the most timely and decisive events of the entire conflict.

For political reasons, the critics of the President have never ceased to talk about the Cambodian affair as if it were some misdeed on the part of the President.

Actually, he was acting on the counsel of military advisers and saw an opportunity to weaken the enemy and to bring the war to an early close.

Some day, when the war is over, the full story of what brought about the decision to enter Cambodia may be disclosed to the public.

But it is too early even now to discuss the sources of intelligence or how the United States found out about the bases and planned the attack that helped to weaken the strength of North Vietnam in its effort to take over South Vietnam.

NEW YORK TIMES

DATE 11/07/70

PAGE 18

# Foe in Cambodia Set Back S

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

PNOMPENH, Cambodia, Oct. 13 — Highly placed sources here believe that the Vietnamese Communist forces, having failed in their initial objective of toppling the Government of Premier Lon Nol through widely diffused military pressure on major population centers, are regrouping and are keeping Cambodia guessing on where they will move next.

Of the 40,000 enemy troops in Cambodia — mainly North Vietnamese units with Vietcong components and few Cambodian guerrillas — the sources estimated that only 5,000 were engaged against the Cambodian Army. The rest are reported to be encamped in the northeast, in provinces securely under Communist control, from which they are said to be in position to strike eastward into South Vietnam, northward into Laos or westward into Cambodia.

The sources who in this country of sketchy and often contradictory military information are considered closest to reliable informants — believe that the next three months, as the dry season gradually takes hold, will provide indications of the enemy's intentions.

For the time being, they say, enemy troop deployment, movement of supplies and radio traffic are of low intensity and provide no significant clues. The enemy is engaging in no major offensive actions but continues to bring steady pressure on the towns of Siemreap and Kompong Thom. Enemy troops are harassing Kompong Cham, Kompong Chhnang, Kompong Speu, and small units are operating near Phnompenh, conducting frequent ambushes on all roads.

The largest concentration of North Vietnamese troops, perhaps 2,000 is 60 miles north of here along Route 6 to Kom-

pong Thom, near the battered village of Taing Kauk, which was recently recaptured by the Cambodians. At that point the Communists have reportedly halted a Government force of 18 to 20 battalions seeking to secure the highway.

Nonetheless, the Government offensive is not considered a failure for two reasons:

The first is that it has diverted the bulk of the Communist forces from beleaguered Kompong Thom and has made it possible to relieve the city by moving several battalions by river from Phnompenh to Kompong Thom.

The second is that the Government drive up Route 6 deflected a movement of enemy troops southward either against Phnompenh or against the South Vietnamese units operating between the capital and the Vietnamese border.

## New Offensive Likely

The informants describe the Cambodian Army's move to relieve Kompong Thom and clear Route 6 as indicative of its capacity to mount at least limited offensives. That contrasts sharply with the first months of the war when the small, underequipped and disorganized Cambodian Army seemed ready for a knockout punch that the Communists never delivered.

Another such limited offensive may be mounted along Route 4, which connects Phnompenh with Cambodia's only deep-water port of Kompong Som, formerly Sihanoukville. Enemy forces in the region of Kampot and Takeo are reported to be showing signs of grave supply and logistics problems.

In the present late stages of the monsoon season, the enemy forces, far from their supply centers, are reported to be unable to operate far from their bases. But Cambodian intelligence indicates that the enem-



The New York Times  
Communist forces in areas of cities concentration of Communists are Rovieng (3). M

is preparing base areas for the season offensive in regions.

The base areas, bunkers and storage areas being dug, are in the province north of Rovieng in the region of Prek Thom and in the northern part of the province north of Kompong Thom. About an hour afterward, a

# Saigon Trade The First Show Is Selling 'St

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 13 (Reuters) — The United States Command reported today that 10 Americans had been killed and 24 wounded in two days of fighting.

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The command said three members of the Americal Division died and seven were wounded today in a clash with guerrillas in Quangngai Province, in the northern part of South Vietnam. Enemy losses were said to have been at least 38 dead.

Despite the continuing fare, Saigon business to show investors that Vietnam has entered ability of the postwar To get the message, they have chosen a trade fair, which opened yesterday.

The fair has been primarily through public interests. The Government contributed land, and plenty of publici

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"We want to set a sphere of confidence who may want to Vietnam," Nguyen Da

an economic research one of the fair's prime explained in English. Peasants to come and fair. If they want to machinery, we will be pleased."

## Japanese Domin

Japanese products beat all other foreign Toyota, Shikani, Mitsubishi and Da some of the Japanese represented. With the fair, an 11-n

nese economic delegation arrived.

5 OCT 1970

# Cambodia a Smart Move

THE CAMBODIAN episode has so far receded that it is barely mentioned any longer. But simply as a study in the ways of modern government, it is worth reporting how new figures have now proved the extreme shrewdness of President Nixon's decision to invade Hanoi's Cambodian sanctuaries.

The decision was based, to begin with, on two related considerations: First, the value to Hanoi of the sanctuaries themselves; and second, the even greater value to Hanoi of the Cambodian supply system, which was continuously replenished by Communist ships unloading at the port of Sihanoukville.

The question of the Cambodian supply system, in turn, had long before touched off one of those bureaucratic comedies in which the U.S. government seems to specialize. In brief, the civilian side of the government did not wish to believe that such a system even existed; hence it long refused to do so, despite the solid evidence produced by the military in Vietnam.

Finally, about two and a half years ago, the evidence became too strong to overlook. But naturally, since the mere fact of the Cambodian supply system had been so long denied, the next step was to downgrade its importance by every means possible.

EVEN LAST YEAR, therefore, our government had two competing estimates, both official, of the tonnages of arms the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong were getting through Sihanoukville. The civilian estimate was a maximum of 8,000 tons a year. The military estimate, made by the U.S. headquarters in Saigon, was 15,000 tons a year.

The difference was important. The lower estimate gave the Cambodian supply system relatively marginal importance, whereas the higher estimate meant that almost enough arms were being brought in through Sihanoukville to nourish the entire war effort of the enemy in the lower half of South Vietnam. In consequence, the difference caused a sanguinary bureaucratic war, while the two sides

gon for month after disputatious month.

Even after the invasion order was given, the difference still had its effect. The lower estimate was in truth the basis for the nonsensical reports from Saigon, that Hanoi was rapidly organizing a "substitute" for Sihanoukville, by expanding the supply lines running through Laos. These were much quoted, to prove that the Cambodian adventure would not have decisive effects.

BY NOW, HOWEVER, the enormous masses of enemy documents taken in Cambodia have finally been analyzed. The arms deliveries through Sihanoukville have been meticulously traced. And the result has been to prove that the Cambodian supply system was actually providing the enemy with more than 21,000 tons per annum.

Here you see the effect, on even the most sober judgments, of wanting to believe what you want to hear. But here you also see why the Cambodian adventure has, in fact, been even more decisive than its few defenders dared to hope at the outset.

With more than 21,000 tons of arms a year coming in through Cambodia, the enemy had far more than enough to supply all his units in III and IV corps. But with the supply flow stopped—as it was instantly stopped when the sanctuaries were invaded—the units in III and IV corps were left without any supply at all.

The result has been what anyone but a certain sort of U.S. senator would naturally expect. In the rich delta provinces of IV corps, for instance, three South Vietnamese divisions of fine quality had had their work cut out for them before the Cambodian invasion.

THEY WERE MAKING progress, but it was fairly slow progress, in part because Hanoi had sent five North Vietnamese regiments into the delta to brace up

regiments continue to hang on there; and their early expulsion can be confidently expected.

The chief American in IV corps, Col. John Paul Vann, has no record of excessive optimism. Yet he now believes that his corps area will be able to get on without one of its three South Vietnamese divisions before this year ends, and will be able to spare another division early next year. Meanwhile, the enemy's strongest and most ancient redoubts in the delta are currently being seized and held.

Altogether, when you reflect on the past impact upon policy of the bureaucratic comedy above-described, this is a cautionary tale.

*Cambodia*

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NEW YORK TIMES

DATE 11 Sep 70

PAGE 4

## **High Thai Aides Now Rule Out Any Manpower for Cambodia**

Special to The New York Times

BANGKOK, Thailand, Sept. 10—Two leading Thai officials have declared that their Government will not send troops to Cambodia. This decision also covers the 3,000 ethnic Cambodians who have been in combat training since July 2, they said:

Deputy Premier Praphas Charusathien and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman said in interviews yesterday that Thailand was now giving priority to settling the Indochina conflict in conformance with resolution of the recent Jakarta conference that called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia.

The two officials said the Thai Government believed the introduction of even volunteer forces would only prompt the communist countries to take reciprocal actions. Originally, a ethnic Cambodian volunteer contingent of 2,000 men was scheduled to leave for active duty in Cambodia by the middle of this month.

Their area of assigned duty was to have been along the Thai border. It was also reported that the Lon Nol government, which had previously requested Thailand to send two divisions of combat troops, now agreed that it would be better for Cambodia to fight on her own.

Foreign minister Thanat did state, however, that "Thailand is giving everything we can spare to the Cambodians, short of manpower." This aid also includes air support whenever requested by Phnompenh.

Nonetheless, should the situation deteriorate to the extent that the sovereignty of Thailand is directly threatened, then "we won't wait but will take measures to safeguard our own security," Mr. Thanat said. In a separate statement he said he believed it would be best if in the future the United States refrained from sending its armed forces into any more Vietnams or Cambodias. He did not elaborate.